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Dear Reader,
After two semesters, the challenges of a global pandemic, and a university-wide transition to online learning, we are proud to 
present Volume Seven of the James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal!
During the 2019-2020 academic year, Managing Editor Logan Roddy led a dedicated crew of interns, editors, and designers 
in publishing the first installments of Volume 7. In the Fall 2020 semester, Managing Editors Kim Stuart and Jennifer Switzer 
took up the mantle of leadership, working with a team of newcomers and experienced returners to deliver the finishing 
touches on our volume and lay the groundwork for future editorial boards.
The transition to managing the publication in an entirely digital space proved to be a new adventure for us all, but the 
Editorial Board has maintained its momentum. This volume represents research from a variety of disciplines, including 
Political Science, History, Sociology, and Integrated Science and Technology. These works, along with pieces published in 
previous volumes, have been downloaded over 32,000 times in the past year by researchers around the world. As our journal 
continues to grow in scope, we have continued to value the support of 200+ faculty experts across the JMU campus who have 
served as reviewers since our first issue.
Volume 7 stands as a testament to the ways that James Madison University as a whole adapts and achieves academic excellence. 
JMURJ is proud to have provided undergraduate students with a platform to showcase their research and scholarship to their 
peers around the globe. This would not be possible without the community we have developed, both within James Madison 
University and beyond. Whether you are a long-time supporter or a first-time reader, we thank you for your patronage and 
hope you enjoy the valuable research and scholarship created by JMU’s undergraduate students.
The JMURJ Editorial Board
Marketing Team
Isabelle Amato
Angela Lin
Sara M.
Clara Peirce
Rochelle Podolsky
ISAT Liaison
Nolan Harrington
Advisor
Kevin Jefferson
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The 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War was the first major conflict of the twentieth century and a turning point in 
the balance of power in East Asia. In the short term, Russia’s defeat helped precipitate the 1905 Russian Revolution 
and the 1917 October Revolution. More broadly, the aftermath of the war informed Japan’s imperial ambitions in 
Manchuria—the early stages of World War II in Asia during the 1930s—and continuing Russo-Japanese enmity 
over Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Island chain. Studying this historical conflict in terms of international relations 
provides valuable insights into the nature of the conflict and how the past continues to shape modern geopolitics. 
As a case study, the war offers important lessons in the difficulties of sustained power projection and the exigencies 
involved in adaptable war planning. Equally important, Russia and Japan’s intractable imperial ambitions coupled 
with their failures to credibly communicate resolve serve as a cautionary tale on the consequences of inept 
diplomacy.
The Russo-Japanese War
Origins and Implications
Benjamin Mainardi
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Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
European great powers carved out spheres of influence in 
East Asia. As available territory became limited, empires 
seeking to expand competed against one another. While 
contemporaries widely regarded Russia as the dominant 
force in East Asia, Japanese power was rapidly growing. 
Both powers preyed on the ailing Qing dynasty of China. 
Russia steadily eroded Chinese territory in the north while 
Japan waged war with China for control of Korea. Sustained 
Russian power projection in the East necessitated access 
to a warm-water port. This was found at Port Arthur on 
the strategic Liaodong Peninsula just north of the Korean 
border. By the late 1890s, Russia and Japan were at odds 
over territorial ambitions in this region. Russian presence 
gradually intensified in Manchuria and began encroaching 
on Korea in spite of Korea’s position within Japan’s sphere 
of influence. 
The resulting contest for 
domination of East Asia would 
become the first major armed 
conflict of the twentieth century.
As this emerging security dilemma began to jeopardize 
Japan’s foothold on the Asian mainland, tensions between 
Russia and Japan escalated. Unable to reach an agreeable 
status quo while neglecting to fully indicate its resolve on 
the issue of Korea, Japan prepared for conflict. In February 
1904, breaching international etiquette established by 
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Imperial 
Japanese Navy launched a surprise strike against the Russian 
Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur prior to officially declaring war 
(Aldrich 2000). The resulting contest for domination of East 
Asia would become the first major armed conflict of the 
twentieth century. Examining this archetypal case study in 
regional power transition reveals the perils of intractability 
and sustained power projection.
Historical Background
Understanding the origins of the Russo-Japanese War first 
necessitates an understanding of contemporary East Asian 
geopolitics. For nearly three thousand years, various Chinese 
imperial dynasties had been the regional superpowers of 
East Asia with few peer competitors. Historians largely agree 
that this lack of true peer-competition led to military and 
industrial stagnation in the later Qing dynasty (Naquin 
1987, 219-221). From 1644 to at least 1800, the dynasty 
was the unquestioned hegemon of East Asia. Yet by 1800, 
Western powers began encroaching on Chinese client-states 
and spheres of influence. Portugal had solidified its hold on 
the once Chinese-held port city of Macau, and the Dutch 
fostered an ever-growing presence in Taiwan and much of 
modern Indonesia. Meanwhile, Spain maintained control of 
the Philippine Islands, the British presence in India was slowly 
permeating throughout Southeast Asia, and friction along 
the Chinese northern border with Russia was intensifying 
(Zhao 1998, 26). However, the Chinese-led international 
order of East and Southeast Asia established by the Tributary 
and Guangzhou Systems persisted (Zhao 1998, 25). 
Largely dissatisfied with these regional systems in which 
the Qing dynasty dominated virtually all political and 
economic affairs, European states gradually began to erode 
Chinese influence in the region. As such, the power of East 
Asia’s traditional hegemony was supplanted throughout the 
nineteenth century, rupturing the unipolar order without a 
sufficiently powerful state to replace China. Russia and Great 
Britain, in particular, heavily shaped the regional dynamics 
of East Asia during the late eighteenth century. Frustrated by 
an inability to expand in the Balkans, Crimea, or Southwest 
Asia in the first half of the eighteenth century, Russia began 
to look eastward. It progressively occupied greater portions 
of eastern Siberia and northern Mongolia, creating tensions 
with China (Malozemoff 1958, 19-23). Great Britain desired 
ever-greater trading rights with the Qing dynasty and 
eventually exacted its economic ambitions through a series of 
conflicts known as the Opium Wars. By 1898, Great Britain, 
France, Germany, and Russia all held de facto control over 
large portions of the Chinese mainland (MacNair and Lach 
1950, 53).
At the same time, Japan was emerging from nearly two 
centuries of self-imposed isolation under the recently 
overthrown Tokugawa Shogunate. The new Meiji government 
recognized that nations not poised for offense were likely to 
be dominated by those that were. After observing the gradual 
erosion of Chinese territory by the West and being subjected 
to unequal trade treaties, the Meiji government’s chief priority 
was modernizing Japan’s industry and military. Prior to 
1850, however, Japan’s economy was still primarily based on 
subsistence agriculture; military technological development 
had largely stagnated since the founding of the Tokugawa 
regime in 1603 (Tuan-Hwee and Moriguchi 2014, 464). 
Extraordinarily, the Meiji government was able to modernize 
effectively using Japan’s existing political infrastructure and 
posture as a great power. Still, to truly accede to great power 
status, Japan needed to expand territorially as the others had. 
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Soon after Western powers began forcing Japan to 
normalize its foreign relations in 1853, Japanese leaders 
sought to expand their fledgling empire. The logical first 
step towards expansion onto the Asian mainland was the 
takeover of the Korean Peninsula. However, Korea had 
traditionally been a Chinese vassal-state, and despite the 
Western powers eroding its influence, the Qing dynasty 
had been able to maintain effective control. In 1876, Japan 
forced the Korean kingdom of Joseon into an unequal 
trade treaty in spite of Chinese objections. 
This expanding Russian sphere 
of influence began to directly 
conflict with Japanese interests. 
Continued Japanese efforts to assert itself into Korean 
politics heightened tensions in Sino-Japanese relations 
Yet after China and Japan signed the peace treaty, the 
terms were forcibly altered by the Tripartite Intervention 
of Russia, Germany, and France, ostensibly to maintain 
the stability of East Asia. Russia was the primary agent 
behind the intervention; it sought both to assert its own 
influence in East Asia and to secure its borders along 
Manchuria against the seemingly powerful China, as 
evidenced by the construction of the Trans-Siberian 
Railway (Malozemoff 1958, 27). Russia particularly 
objected to the Japanese acquisition of the harbor city of 
Port Arthur since it hoped to establish it as its own warm-
water port in the East (Kowner 2006, 375). Japan agreed 
to altered terms of peace in the face of the three great 
powers, whose combined naval capabilities outmatched 
Japan’s.1 The terms imposed by the Tripartite Intervention 
prevented Japan from acquiring the Liaodong Peninsula 
and Port Arthur in exchange for an additional 30 million 
taels of silver to be paid by China. This intervention by 
the Russian diplomatic coalition humiliated Japan and 
created a deep sense of suspicion towards the Russians. 
In turn, Japan began further investing in its machine 
industry and military while also signing an alliance with 
Great Britain to counterbalance Russia (Burton 1990, 
100).
Japanese suspicions were confirmed when Russian forces 
occupied Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula in 
1898. Following the fortification of Port Arthur, Russia 
     1 Kowner’s Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War, 375 records the 
local naval power disparity during the 1895 intervention as being thirty-eight 
allied Russian, French, and German warships with a displacement of 95,000 tons 
compared to thirty-one Japanese warships with a displacement of 57,000 tons.
progressively began encroaching on both China and 
Korea, gaining a number of economic concessions. This 
expanding Russian sphere of influence began to directly 
conflict with Japanese interests. Should Japan not have 
contested Russia’s rising power, the island nation itself 
would have been cut off from expansion onto the Asian 
mainland. As such, Japanese leaders became increasingly 
convinced conflict with Russia was necessary (Zhang 
1998, 53). Similarly, Russia was apt to resist Japan’s 
rising power because reducing efforts to supplant China 
as the hegemon of East Asia was counter to its interests 
and investment in eastern territories. The breaking point 
came when, in spite of their assurances they would not do 
so, Russian forces continued to occupy the Chinese region 
of Manchuria and initiated the construction of railways 
connecting the region to its territory after the suppression 
of the Boxer Rebellion in 1901 (Katō 2007, 101).2 
Entering negotiations over these actions, Japan sought 
to establish a status quo whereby Russia acknowledged 
its control of Korea and Japan acknowledged Russian 
control of Manchuria. When this proposal was rebuffed, 
Japan understood that Russian actions indicated an even 
greater desire for eastern territory. Another attempt at 
negotiations to demilitarize the area also failed as the 
lack of trust between the two states and concern over 
the emerging security dilemma thwarted compromise 
(Malozemoff 1958, 246). Thus, Japan would need to check 
Russian expansion by force if it was to expand.
Capabilities and Strategies
On the eve of war in 1904, there was a great disparity in 
potential capabilities between Russia and Japan. The 1904 
total population of Russia was roughly 125,000,000 whereas 
Japan possessed a population of only 67,273,000 (Keltie 
1904, 1022-92; 855-75). This massive population difference 
was equally present in military personnel. Pre-war Russian 
military strength was approximately 1,160,000 men while 
Japanese forces only numbered 218,000 (Sarkees and 
Wayman 2010). Furthermore, the Russian navy possessed 
sixty-four warships while the Japanese navy only totaled 
thirty-four (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). And while Japanese 
military expenditures in 1904 far outstripped Russia’s, US 
$89.5 million to US $66.9 million (Sarkees and Wayman 
2010). Russia exceeded Japan in industrial production. 
     2 The Boxer Rebellion was a reactionary uprising in Chinese society in the face of 
increasing Westernization. Between 1899 and 1901, to expel foreign influence from 
China, Boxer rebels and Chinese imperial forces engaged the Eight-Nation Alliance 
that included Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, 
and the United States. The conflict resulted in a decisive victory for the colonial 
powers, but marked a general decline in direct intervention in China save for Japan, 
Russia, and the United States. For more information on the Boxer Rebellion, see 
Silbey, The Boxer Rebellion; Esherick, Origins; or Bickers, The Scramble for China. 
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Russia produced 2,766,000 tons of iron and steel annually 
as of 1904 while Japan produced only 60,000 tons (Sarkees 
and Wayman 2010). Overall, the Correlates of War Project 
scored Japan’s 1904 composite national capability as 0.0545 
and Russia’s as 0.1132 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).3 This 
scoring represents that in 1904, Japan possessed 5.45 percent 
of world material capabilities while Russia accounted for 
11.32 percent.
While Japan was certainly outmatched by Russian material 
capabilities, its greatest advantage was geography. At its 
shortest distance from the home island of Kyushu, Japan 
was positioned approximately one hundred miles away from 
the Korean Peninsula (Cooling 1994, 455). In contrast, the 
distance by rail from Moscow to Port Arthur was almost five 
thousand miles (Asakawa 1904, 64). Complicating the issue 
posed by this vast distance was the fact that the Trans-Siberian 
Railway had only one track and was not yet fully completed. 
This created an inherent operational disadvantage which was 
further compounded by the concentration of Russian ground 
forces in Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia. As such, Japan’s 
army was able to face Russian forces with relative parity in 
numbers. Similarly, almost two-thirds of Russian warships 
were located in either the Black Sea or the Baltic Sea. Russia’s 
Pacific Fleet was also divided between the recently acquired 
Port Arthur and the traditional eastern base of Vladivostok. 
Any Russian reinforcements would have to travel by ship 
and sail around the Cape of Good Hope, a voyage of several 
weeks (Koda 2005, 22). Equally devastating to Russian 
field capabilities was the lack of an efficient communication 
network that reached East Asia.
This unstable foundation for 
military operations represented 
a failure in Russia’s grand 
strategy.
Military strategist Carl von Clausewitz emphasized the 
necessity of focusing on the enemy’s center of gravity (von 
Clausewitz [1832] 2004, 687). This was Japan’s second 
greatest advantage, as Russia had virtually no capability to 
both protect its recent gains in Manchuria and also strike 
mainland Japan. Its forces were limited in tactical mobility 
and had to maintain a responsive posture to Japanese 
movements. Furthermore, since Russia would largely be 
     3 The Correlates of War Project is an academic effort to analyze and study the 
facets of conflict since 1816. Correlates of War datasets incorporate a number of 
variables that factor into national military and industrial capabilities using quanti-
tative data. For more information, see correlatesofwar.org.
unable to resupply or communicate with its eastern forces 
by land, any concerted campaigns would require substantial 
planning. Thus, Japanese war planners were able to exercise 
more freedom in the campaigns. What resulted was a 
strategy of denial and targeted operations. First, destroying 
the Russian Pacific Fleet would cripple Russian mobility 
and constrict supply lines (Westwood 1986, 38). Second, 
campaigns undertaken with naval superiority in specific zones 
of operation would give Japanese land forces the tactical edge 
needed to overcome Russian numbers (Westwood 1986, 52). 
In contrast, Russia’s eastward expansion severely hampered 
its logistical capabilities, since it lacked proper lines of 
communication and transportation from the industrial 
heartland. Such expansion almost completely drained 
Russia’s financial reserves, leaving the country dependent on 
borrowing large sums from France and Germany (Hunter 
1993, 146). 
Overall, this unstable foundation for military operations 
represented a failure in Russia’s grand strategy. Conversely, 
Japan’s grand strategy was distinctly more calculated. 
Japan followed the British example and focused on naval 
development, constructing the fourth strongest fleet in the 
world by 1902 (Evans and Peattie 2012, 89). As such, Japan 
was able to effectively transport forces to the Asian mainland 
with greater ease than any other contemporary great power. 
Furthermore, Japanese efforts to gain support from foreign 
powers in the form of loans would eventually account for 
almost 40 percent of its wartime expenditure (Hunter 1993, 
151). 
In contrast, modern observers generally find Russian 
preparations for conflict in the East against Japan surprisingly 
lackluster. These plans were predicated on the notion that 
Japan would never be the instigating power (Jukes 2002, 
18). In fact, Russian Viceroy of the Far Eastern Fleet Admiral 
Alekseev expressed an overwhelming confidence in Russian 
military dominance declaring in 1903 that “our plan of 
operations should be based on the assumption that it is 
impossible for our fleet to be beaten, taking into consideration 
the present relationship of the two fleets, and that a Japanese 
landing is impracticable” (Westwood 1986, 37). Yet such 
a cursory look at Russian strategy in the East neglects the 
realities of being the world’s largest land power. As Nicholas 
Papastratigakis (2011) observed in Russian Imperialism and 
Naval Power: Military Strategy and the Build-Up to the Russo-
Japanese War, the Russian military apparatus faced no less 
than three major theaters of operations of which the Pacific 
had been deemed the least precarious. The Baltic Sea and the 
Black Sea, positioned significantly closer to the capital at St. 
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Petersburg and Russia’s industrial heartland, both presented 
theaters with greater numbers of rivals that appeared to pose 
a more significant threat to Russia’s national security. As a 
result, the protection of Russia’s holdings in the East would 
rely primarily on defensive naval positioning to prevent 
landings close to Port Arthur, forcing the Japanese into a 
ground war in which vast territories and superior Russian 
numbers could exhaust the small island nation (Patrikeef 
and Shukman 2007, 56). Indeed, in his book on the Russian 
army prior to and during the war with Japan, Commander 
in Chief Aleksey Nikolaevich Kuropatkin noted that the 
Japanese navy outnumbered Russian naval strength in the 
region, relegating the Far Eastern Fleet to a tool of deterrence 
and his ground forces to defensive operations (Kuropatkin 
1909, 27). Kuropatkin therefore argued that his elastic line 
of defense had allowed troop concentrations to retire when 
pressed and nearby garrisons to flank and attack Japanese 
forces (Kuropatkin 1909, 28).
Resolution and Aftermath
Successive Japanese victories throughout 1904 shocked the 
Russian regime, but Russia was ultimately unwilling to sue 
for peace. This unwillingness to accede to proposed Japanese 
terms for peace was in large part due to the influence of Tsar 
Nicholas II’s concern for prestige, but also because the vast 
majority of Russian land forces remained intact (Westwood 
1986, 157). Regardless, the war progressively evolved into 
a stalemate following the Japanese capture of the Liaodong 
Peninsula. Declining offers for an early armistice, Tsar 
Nicholas II sent the majority of Russia’s Baltic Fleet eastward 
in late 1904 via the Cape of Good Hope. This relief force 
was decisively defeated in the 1905 Battle of Tsushima. In 
the battle, Russia lost eleven battleships, four cruisers, six 
destroyers, and twenty-seven auxiliary ships while Japan 
lost only three torpedo boats (Regan 1992, 178). Again, in 
spite of severe losses, Tsar Nicholas II wanted to escalate the 
conflict, but rising domestic tensions coupled with Russian 
revolutionary gains forced him to enter into negotiations in 
August of 1905 (Connaughton 1992, 342).4 Concurrently, 
Japanese losses on land had been mounting, and leaders 
contacted President Theodore Roosevelt to help mediate a 
peace agreement (Connaughton 1992, 272). In its entirety, 
the Russo-Japanese War lasted from February 8, 1904 to 
September 5, 1905. Over the course of nineteen months, 
roughly 2.5 million men had been mobilized and upwards 
     4 Beginning in January of 1905, massed socio-political protests emerged in much 
of Russia largely due to severe social and economic inequality as well as a growing 
discontent with the Russo-Japanese War. Much of the unrest was suppressed using 
military force as typified by “Bloody Sunday,” but the disruptions caused by the 
revolution were severe. For more information about the 1905 revolution see Salisbury, 
Black Night, White Snow; Ascher, Revolution of 1905; or Surh, 1905 in St. Petersburg.
of two hundred thousand were killed or wounded in action 
(Dumas and Vedel-Peterson 1923, 57-9).
The zero-sum nature of the Treaty 
of Portsmouth would perpetuate 
strained relations between the 
two states. 
Even after agreeing to enter into negotiations to end the 
conflict, Russia and Japan hotly contested the negotiation 
planning in an effort to save some level of prestige (Trani 
1969, 62). Delegates on both sides took stark positional 
approaches centered around territorial changes. Ultimately, 
the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5, 1905. It 
stipulated that Russia must recognize Korea as part of Japan’s 
sphere of influence and establish exclusive Japanese control 
over Korea (“Text of the Treaty of Portsmouth,” 1905). 
Further, Russia was required to withdraw from Manchuria, 
cede the southern portion of Sakhalin Island, and transfer 
the leasing rights of Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula 
to Japan (“Text of the Treaty of Portsmouth,” 1905). Yet 
this resolution failed to address the underlying issues of 
conflicting Japanese and Russian interests in the region. 
Russia had been denied access to a significant warm-water 
port and lost control of part of its homeland, the southern 
half of Sakhalin Island, which ultimately curtailed eastward 
expansion. The zero-sum nature of the Treaty of Portsmouth 
would perpetuate strained relations between the two states 
that continued through the decline of the Russian Empire in 
1917 and into the Soviet period. 
Japan’s decisive victory crippled Russian international prestige 
and power projection capability. Additionally, the substantial 
loss of face by the Russian regime contributed to the rise of the 
1905 Russian Revolution and the 1917 October Revolution. 
In crippling Russia, whether intentionally or not, Japan 
had effectively removed its sole rival in East Asia while also 
gaining large portions of territory. Yet victory came at a cost 
of a forty-fold increase in the national debt with an annual 
interest accounting for roughly a quarter of the Japanese 
budget (Oyama and Ogawa 1932, 252). In turn, East Asia’s 
new hegemon began developing a regional system of direct 
political and economic imperialism that would come to be 
known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Theoretical Explanation
Due to the decline of Chinese power, the East Asian region 
lost its hegemony that had guaranteed international stability 
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for centuries. The ensuing power vacuum evolved into a semi-
multipolar system whereby major European states effectively 
divided East Asia among themselves. It should be noted that 
Britain and Russia were distinctly more able to project power 
to the region. However, Britain primarily sought to further 
economic ties while Russia sought actual territorial gains and 
the assertion of its own rule. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, the only two states that possessed significant forces 
in the region were Japan and Russia. Despite both actors 
cooperating in the suppression of the 1900 Boxer Rebellion 
and engaging in some trading enterprises, this dyad was 
ultimately unable to establish a status quo suitable to both 
parties.
This inability to compromise on delineating spheres of 
influence was largely due to the overwhelming expansionary 
ambitions of both states. Progressively, Russia attempted to 
fill the power vacuum left by China’s decline through a series 
of territorial expansions and treaties with the ailing Qing 
dynasty. Japan, however, was dissatisfied with the emerging 
Russian supremacy in East Asia (Zhao 1998, 52). Yet when 
accounting for certain variables, both states had relative 
parity in military capabilities. In turn, as Lemke and Werner 
(1996) argued in Power Parity, Commitment to Change, 
and War, conflict was highly likely as both actors possessed 
similar capabilities and competed for the same position in 
the regional hierarchy. As such, Japan engaged in conflict 
with Russia to challenge Russia’s rise to power in East Asia. 
Likewise, Russia was unwilling to yield to Japan’s demands, 
as doing so would hamper the ability to impose a system 
favorable to its own ambitions.
This inability to compromise 
on delineating spheres of 
influence was largely due to the 
overwhelming expansionary 
ambitions of both states.
The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War can be attributed 
to the contiguity of competing expansionary ambitions. The 
zero-sum game of territorial acquisition was a driving factor 
in the outbreak of war. For Russia, expansion in the East, 
especially in Manchuria and Korea, offered an unparalleled 
economic opportunity (Katō 2007, 101). Russia had largely 
been contained in the West by European interventions and 
could not allow itself to be closed off in the East as well 
(Geyer 1987, 192). Similarly, Japan lacked the prestige and 
power of the other great powers due to its recent entrance 
onto the world stage and small territorial holdings. As an 
island nation, Japan needed to establish a foothold on the 
Asian mainland. Yet any expansion or military buildup by 
one of these powers inherently required a reciprocal response.
Incomplete information and lack 
of compromise prevented the 
peaceful resolution of conflict, 
making war the rational choice.
The intractability of Russian and Japanese expansionary 
ambitions is evidenced by their inability to negotiate. 
Japanese leaders sought Russian assurances that they would 
not interfere in their de facto control of Korea. Likewise, 
Russian leaders wanted Japanese recognition of their 
exclusive economic control of Manchuria. What doomed 
negotiations was the linkage of Manchuria to Korea. Indeed, 
for either state, Manchuria represented potentially massive 
economic gains as a populous, resource-rich region (Katō 
2007, 101). However, Russia needed to maintain a warm-
water harbor at Port Arthur to effectively reap the benefits of 
controlling Manchuria. For Japan, Port Arthur represented 
a historical grievance against Russia and presented a direct 
threat to its control of Korea. Furthermore, the potential 
loss of trade with a region as large as Manchuria would be 
severely detrimental to the Japanese economy that relied 
heavily on trade. Bargaining over these issues was strained 
by Russia’s severe underestimation of Japanese capabilities 
and overestimation of its own. Indeed, Russian Viceroy of 
the Far Eastern Fleet Admiral Alekseev publicly expressed 
such ideas (Westwood 1986, 37). Most importantly, Tsar 
Nicholas II genuinely believed that Japan would yield in the 
face of Russia’s perceived superiority (Jukes 2002, 18). This 
misconception regarding Japanese intentions was, in part, 
the fault of the Japanese government as it failed to indicate 
its resolve to go to war over the question of Korea (Katō 
2007, 102). As such, incomplete information and lack of 
compromise prevented the peaceful resolution of conflict, 
making war the rational choice.
Conclusion
With the effective subversion of its traditional hegemony 
throughout the nineteenth century, the East Asian region 
quickly devolved into systemic anarchy. Hoping to fill the 
void left by China’s weakness, Russia and Japan sought to 
expand territorial control in the region. The Russian need for 
a warm-water port in the Far East was crucial to establishing a 
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strategic base in the region. Likewise, Japan lacked a foothold 
on the Asian mainland and needed to secure its sphere of 
influence in Korea. Thus, limited options for expansion 
placed both actors in opposition to one another’s interests. 
Japan’s defeat of Russian forces shocked contemporary 
observers and effectively marked its ascension to regional 
hegemony over East Asia. This drastic shift in the balance 
of power would be a major contributing factor to Japanese 
expansion into China and the South Pacific throughout the 
next several decades. As a case study in competing ambitions 
of great powers, the Russo-Japanese War offers an exemplary 
instance of an external security dilemma and regional power 
transition.
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This cross-national study examines the ongoing gender imbalance in positions of power in local and national 
governments. While some countries have gone to great lengths to combat disproportion and inequality, others have 
taken steps backwards and have made it almost impossible to achieve equal opportunities for women. Despite the 
fact that women make up almost half of the world’s population, men still far outnumber women in government in 
the majority of countries worldwide. This quantitative study analyzes variation in women’s political representation 
in four categories: domestic roles, wage parity, political systems, and gender quotas. The results suggest that 
although the number of women pursuing and achieving positions of political office is increasing, challenges and 
historical tendencies still persist.
Variation in Women’s Political 
Representation Across 
Countries
Julianna Heck
“women’s march Chicago 2018” by Candid Characters is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
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Few elements of the global body politic engage as much 
consideration as women’s representation, or lack of 
representation, does during elections. Women, who comprise 
nearly half of the world’s population, continue to suffer 
imbalance and stagnant progress. The scarcity of women in 
local, state, and national government positions is a pertinent 
issue for countries around the world. This enduring gender 
imbalance in politics must be a concern as the world works 
to address a host of old and emerging challenges.
Limited female representation continues to have effects on a 
global scale, such as elevated corruption, increased cynicism 
and disengagement, and curtailment of policies concentrated 
on health, education, civil rights, and inclusion of minority 
groups (Ashenafi, 2004; Raza, 2007). In order to more 
accurately understand this breakdown, political scientists 
must first grasp the mechanisms, motivations, implications, 
and justifications that cause imbalance in political gender 
representation. Detecting the causes of female political 
underrepresentation will help actors develop effective, 
enforceable policies to eliminate all forms of exclusion. 
Proportionate participation and representation of women in 
politics would not only contribute to justice and democracy, 
but establish a necessary “pre-condition” for valuing women’s 
priorities (Beauregard, 2016, p. 99; Kassa, 2015, p. 1).  
A number of case studies have analyzed the scope of women’s 
political underrepresentation and its causes in individual 
countries, but few have investigated inclusive measures that 
apply to a cross-national study (Rule, 1994). Literature has 
also “draw[n] a distinction between quantitative statistical 
analyses and qualitative case studies,” but few researchers have 
utilized a combination of both measurement tactics (Krook, 
2010, p. 233). Many sources have examined strategies to 
deliver parity in the aftermath of decades of monopolized 
male elections, but “limits to prediction and prescription 
when it comes to implementation” have made it difficult to 
calculate causal variables across distinct countries (Crocker, 
2010, p. 686).
Literature Review
Beyond individual country studies, non-governmental 
organizations such as the United Nations Commission on 
the Status of Women (CSW), Emily’s List, the National 
Women’s Political Caucus, the Sisters of Purity, and She 
Should Run have allowed research on women’s political 
representation on a cross-national level using data from 
sources like the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 
scholarly journals, and historical events. The data on women’s 
political representation have been evaluated on multiple 
scales using various measures of analysis such as the “Women 
in Politics: 2017” infographic presented at the IPU-UN Press 
Conference for the CSW. The map and its accompanying 
tables critically examine all causes and effects of incongruity 
and reiterate the fact that, in UN Women Executive Director 
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka’s words, “persistent missing 
voices of women” and an “overall stagnation and specific 
reversals are warning bells of erosion of equality that we must 
heed and act on rapidly” (IPU, 2017a). 
Domestic Roles
During the Rosie the Riveter era of World War II, a Stokely’s 
tomato advertisement urged women to “perform a service 
without which this war cannot be won,” while a Chef 
Boy-ar-dee commercial emphasized “not just in overalls 
or a uniform—but even more in an apron—the American 
woman is serving her country today as never before” (Inness, 
2001, p. 124). Although the early 20th-century marketing 
technique placed the value of working women on a similar 
pedestal to those serving in war, they still played to the 
concept of a “good-looking ... good-cooking girl” (Inness, 
2001, p. 37). Suzanne O’Malley reiterated a similar theme 
in a 1992 Cosmopolitan article: “as far as I’m concerned, Men 
and Cooking is an oxymoron. Lots of guys cook something. 
But if your life depended on someone to cook for you, who 
you gonna call? A man? I doubt it” (as cited in Inness, 2001, 
p. 17). While domestic tasks such as cooking and caring for 
children are associated with being feminine, they do not 
reflect the individuality and image of real women, but only 
affirm norms fabricated by society. Even in more modern 
days when a woman is allowed to replace her sewing kit or 
saucepan with a stethoscope, gavel, or briefcase, some still 
find the idea of a man cooking anything besides burgers and 
steaks incredible. 
In British Social Attitudes 30, Park et al. (2013) concluded 
that “in the mid-1980s close to half of the public agreed that 
‘a man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after 
the home and family’” (p. 115). The same statement was 
only applicable to thirteen percent of the population in 2012 
(Park et al., 2013, p. 115). The decline of the generational 
“male breadwinner” family system has not only altered the 
traditional patriarchal views that the woman’s place is strictly 
in the household, but has allowed more women to join the 
conventional workforce.
Vigil (2019) noted that “Many of the contemporary 
difficulties women face as political actors are grounded in 
deeply entrenched perspectives that interpret women in 
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exceptionally narrow terms” (p. 189). The macho culture 
of politics classifies women as unequipped to play on a 
level playing field with men. Carlin and Winfrey (2009) 
explained that “In general, describing women in sexist terms 
reduces their credibility or may cause them to be seen as less 
human” (p. 328). The media’s portrayal of the appearance 
of female candidates using metaphors that illustrate women 
with animal characteristics, children’s vocabulary, and food 
terminology such as “foxy,” “saucy,” “old bat,” or “shrew” 
minimizes their status and hinders their political success 
(Carlin & Winfrey, 2009, p. 328). 
Similarly, being depicted as more caring, compassionate, 
understandable, and likely to be honest can bolster female 
candidates, but can also minimize their ability to perform 
in leadership roles, as women are “identified with emotional 
matters” and questioned because of “maternal responsibilities” 
(Carlin & Winfrey, 2009, p. 328). Bohn (2017) noted that 
the concept of motherhood also works in two dimensions, as 
it hinders their option of running for elected positions due 
to perceived responsibilities to their children, but also allows 
them to “[hone] their expertise regarding particular political 
domains” such as reproductive rights, child care services, and 
human trafficking (p. 14). The modern atmosphere of later 
marriages, delayed childbearing, and declining fertility rates 
has shifted the former label of motherhood and femininity as 
a weakness, positing “that motherhood imbues women with 
values that voters deem highly desirable in current politics” 
(Bohn, 2017, p. 14). 
In other countries, progress has remained less evident. The 
election of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations Commission 
on the Status of Women, which is dedicated to the promotion 
of gender equality and empowerment of women, was highly 
criticized due to the existence of a “male guardianship 
system” which enables men to “remain in control over female 
relatives’ lives” (Coogle, 2017). This patriarchal system 
has been at the heart of unequal treatment of women in a 
country which “forbids women from obtaining a passport, 
marrying, or travelling abroad without the approval of a 
male guardian” (Coogle, 2017). Victims of the hegemonic 
system have been arrested or detained for questioning the 
one-sided government regime or challenging statutes on the 
claims of abuse by male counterparts (Coogle, 2017). 
H1: Countries that are more accepting of traditional gender 
and domestic roles as norms are less likely to have women’s 
political representation.
Wage Parity
Variation in wage parity can aid in predicting the distribution 
of women’s representation in government. Countries such 
as Spain, Austria, and Denmark require that companies 
evaluate the effectiveness of their gender equality programs 
and Australian law mandates equal pay for comparable work. 
Despite this progress, the World Economic Forum (2018) 
projected that it will take 202 years to close the “economic 
opportunity gender gap” (p. 15).
Despite the conclusive research surrounding women’s lack of 
participation in politics, there is little research on the role 
that money plays in keeping women from entering into 
the arena of politics. Burns et al. (2001) demonstrated that 
women are less disposed to run for political office if it means 
that they have to go through added expenses. These costs 
may include primary elections or challenging an incumbent. 
This correlates with the perception that men are more risk-
seeking in the realm of politics, whereas women are seen 
as more risk-averse. The source also takes into account 
the contrasting views of feasibility and the lower levels of 
encouragement that women receive from political actors. 
Scholarly consensus suggests that limited access to campaign 
financing and a perceived lack of ambition are viewed as lack 
of qualifications for positions ranging from local governments 
to high levels of parliament (Bangs, 2017). 
A study conducted by the Pew Research Center noted that 
“seven-in-ten women—vs. about half of men—say a major 
reason why women are underrepresented in top positions 
in politics and business is that they have to do more to 
prove themselves” (Horowitz et al., 2018). The study also 
emphasized that women are more likely than men to see 
structural barriers and uneven expectations holding them 
back from earning positions of high leadership. As U.S. 
Bureau of the Budget official Rufus Miles observed in the 
late 1940s, “Where you stand depends on where you sit”: 
women typically begin their careers at lower entry positions 
and earn less than men with comparable qualifications 
(Wolford, 2005, p. 85). 
The issue is not exclusive to North America and Europe. 
Women in South Korea earn one third less than their male 
counterparts, the highest gender wage gap among the 
countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. Additionally, a case study on Chile points 
out that financing elections is one of the key indicators 
keeping women out of political office. Chilean politician 
Maria Antonieta Saa observed that “[m]en will take risks, 
they will sell their family house ... but a woman is not going 
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to put her family at risk” (as cited in Franceschet, 2005, 
89). Similarly, China does not allow women to enter the 
securities industry because it is more important for them to 
marry well than find a good job. As a result of societal and 
familial pressures, promotions and leadership opportunities 
are extremely limited (“What Are the Obstacles,” 2017). 
H2: Countries with higher levels of wage parity between 
men and women will have greater political representation of 
women.
Political Systems
The UN-IPU “Women in Politics: 2017” infographic 
indicates there are only eleven women heads of state in 157 
countries which elect their leaders. Analyses from the 1980s 
and early 1990s emphasized the “importance of political 
factors, such as the structure of the electoral system and the 
partisan composition of parliament, as determinants of the 
proportion of legislative seats held by women” (Kenworthy 
& Malami, 1999, p. 236). According to USAid (2016), 
“Countries with increased women’s participation and 
leadership in civil society and political parties tend to be 
more inclusive, responsive, egalitarian, and democratic.” 
This has shown true in Bolivia with the establishment of Law 
243 against harassment and political violence, which enabled 
women to use their roles as legislators on an unprecedented 
level (“Bolivia Approves,” 2012).
In contrast, in Saudi Arabia and other countries, there 
are “legislative, social, educational, and occupational 
constraints that prevent women from fully participating 
in the development process of their country” (Rajkhan, 
2014, pp. iv-2). Although women make up the majority of 
voters in Brazil, the massive country “ranks 32nd among 
the 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries according 
to the proportion of women in the National Congress” 
(Cristaldo, 2018). Brazilians live in a society that is “highly 
oppressive towards minorities” and women, and requires a 
“deconstruct[ion] of ideologies that dehumanize women” 
in order to expand societal cultivation and cooperation 
(Conway, 2017). Brazilian feminist scholars have concluded 
that the introduction of a female approach to foreign policy 
and domestic initiatives could play a considerable role in 
policy decision-making impacting their country (Conway, 
2017). For instance, although Australia’s first female Minister 
for Foreign Affairs rejected the label of  “feminist,” “she paved 
the way for another woman to follow, in what has otherwise 
been a male-dominated portfolio” (Conway, 2018).
In the United States, the single member district system makes 
it hard for women to break the structural and systemic barriers 
that hinder their political participation. The manipulation of 
the electoral system to disproportionately benefit men limits 
women’s ability to discuss and restructure the systems and 
barriers that block their progress. Studies have indicated 
that “political scientists have known for a long time that 
more women are elected in proportional representation 
systems than in plurality ones,” but “have usually focused on 
limitations of women themselves (their lack of aggressiveness 
and interest in politics), or on prejudice by voters or party 
leaders” (Welch & Studlar, 1990, pp. 391-392). Only in 
recent years have investigations suggested that prejudice is 
embedded in the structure of many political and electoral 
systems. 
Political system type is a crucial characteristic that can 
determine the outcome of a country’s efforts to value women’s 
representation and participation in politics. Evidence from 
studies of the wealthiest democratic nations “strongly suggests 
that the structure of the electoral system matters. ... [I]t is 
one of the most important factors, if not the most important, 
in accounting for variation in the female share of legislators” 
(Kenworthy & Malami, 1999, p. 237). For example, Wilber 
(2011) noted that the Rwandan government “prioritized 
women, introducing structures and processes designed to 
advance them at all levels of leadership.” In contrast, in 
Kuwait, “women have failed in politics so far partly due to the 
‘stalling’ nature of political life” (as cited in Shalaby & Obeid, 
2017). The limitations to the constitution and structure of 
the monarchy prevent female newcomers from mobilizing 
voters, establishing electoral bases, and winning supporters. 
Although no single policy will advance Kuwaiti women’s 
access to political power, previous research has confirmed 
that affirmative action policies are some of the most effective 
mechanisms to facilitate women’s representation (“Kuwait: 
Tackling Persistent Barriers,” 2016).  
H3: Countries that are more democratic will have higher 
levels of women’s political representation.
Gender Quotas
Crocker (2010) observes that “Research on gender quotas 
has become one of the fastest growing areas of scholarship 
within the subfield of women and politics,” and has 
received attention and application from both developing 
and developed countries (p. 686). Gender quotas have 
been found to have a positive association with the number 
of women holding political positions, and these structural 
changes to redress the underrepresentation of women 
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are easier than reconstructing political culture or shifting 
economic development (Caul, 2001; Gray, 2003, p. 55). 
For example, the consistent increasing rates of women 
with political representation in Scandinavian countries are 
congruent with findings supporting gender quota policies 
(Gray, 2003, p. 54). In countries such as Rwanda, where 
women outnumber men in government, “post-conflict peace 
operations” in the aftermath of the genocide helped foster 
gender quotas and a consolidated society (Bush, 2011, p. 
103; Wilber, 2011). Paired with institutional reform, the 
“institutional configurational change” that quotas offer can 
promote progress (Crocker, 2010, p. 687).
Despite the increasing use of gender quotas, some scholars 
argue that quotas distort the meaning of representation 
and give the erroneous idea that only women can represent 
women. Scholars who do not support gender quotas also 
argue that reserved seats foster a competitive environment 
where women compete against each other rather than work 
together to collectively achieve more influence in politics 
(Dhanda, 2000, p. 2969). Critics have also argued that 
gender quotas “[address] only one dimension of inequality 
at a time” (Hughes, 2011, p. 604). Nonetheless, gender 
quotas have the potential to transform other dimensions 
in the domain of politics, such as reducing voter bias and 
inaugurating a norm that heterogeneous representation of 
women in politics.
H4: Countries that have implemented gender quotas will 
have higher levels of women’s political representation.
Methods and Data
Dependent Variable
To measure the dependent variable, I assessed women’s 
political representation using the “percentage of women in 
the lower or single House” of national parliaments compiled 
in the IPU’s (2017b) March 2017 “Women in National 
Parliaments” resource. This ratio data allowed variations 
between countries to be easily calculated. Higher percentage 
values corresponded with a higher number of women 
holding political office, allowing me to compare female 
political representation across countries using the following 
independent variables: domestic roles, wage parity, political 
apparatus, electoral system, and the existence of a gender 
quota. These variables were tested using a linear regression 
model to account for the persistent dependent variable.  
The method used to calculate the proportion of seats 
occupied by women in parliament does not present any 
significant threats to the validity or reliability of my data. 
The percentage of seats occupied by women in each single 
or lower chamber of parliament was calculated by dividing 
the total number of seats occupied by women by the total 
number of seats in parliament. The data compiled by the 
IPU (2017b) uses official statistics provided by national 
parliaments and is updated on a monthly basis. The only 
threat to validity is that the measure does not address the 
sometimes dramatically different percentages of women in 
countries’ upper houses. However, calculating the mean 
percentage of women in two houses for some countries 
would distort the data and lead to inaccurate comparisons. 
Using only the IPU’s “%W” column in the “Lower or single 
House” category guaranteed consistency since there was no 
weighting or normalizing of statistics.
Independent Variables
Domestic Roles. Domestic roles is one of the most prominent 
variables discussed in the literature. Similar to the culture 
variable, defining acceptance of traditional gender and 
domestic roles as societal norms is a troublesome task. I used 
the Gender Inequality Index (GII) from the United Nations 
Development Programme’s (2018) Human Development 
Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update to test this 
variable. The GII represents inequalities using a zero to one 
scale, with higher values indicating increased inequalities. 
As a whole, the GII “shows the loss in potential human 
development due to disparity between female and male 
achievements in three dimensions: reproductive health, 
empowerment and the labour market”  (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2019). The GII “relies on data 
from major publicly available international databases,” which 
in turn draw on reputable organizations like the World 
Health Organization, the World Bank, the IPU, UNESCO, 
and UNICEF (United Nations Development Programme, 
2019). While the index does not capture important concerns 
like gender-based violence and asset ownership due to 
limited data availability, it offers a clear understanding of the 
achievement gaps between men and women. 
Wage Parity. While wage disparity is closely related to 
educational attainment and social class, this variable 
provided distinctions that outside factors did not take into 
consideration. Wage disparity gives insight into psychological 
questions of motivation that limit women from gaining 
political office. It is important to note that these factors are 
often outside of their control. I used the Global Gender 
Gap Index (GGGI), from the World Economic Forum’s 
(2017) Global Gender Gap Report, which examines the gap 
between men and women in four subindexes, but I only 
applied the data from the “Economic Participation and 
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Opportunity” category. This subindex reflects differences 
between women and men in workforce participation, earned 
income, and advancement in technical and professional 
positions (p. 5). By removing the three other subindexes, I 
eliminated the possibility of tautology in the areas of health 
and empowerment, which are fundamental components of 
the GII. Additionally, while education has helped women 
to begin catching up to men in holding seats in national 
parliaments, the literature indicates that advances in women’s 
education pale in comparison to the existence of unequal pay 
for equal work. Achieving the same advanced degrees as men 
can aid in women’s political representation, but if women 
cannot afford the added expenses, then it is a lost cause.
The GGGI’s zero to one scale from imparity to parity is 
calculated for each country. These benchmarks—0 for 
complete inequality and 1 for complete equality—are 
kept fixed over time, which increases the consistency of 
the measure (World Economic Forum, 2017, p. 7). This 
also allows scholars to follow the progression of individual 
countries in relation to a perceived standard of ideal equality 
levels. There are no anticipated threats to reliability because 
a “country must have data available for a minimum of 12 
indicators out of the 14 that make up the index” to be 
included in the report (World Economic Forum, 2017, p. 
7). Additionally, 106 of the 144 countries in the 2017 GGGI 
have been consistently included in the report every year since 
the first edition was published in 2006, and any “missing 
data is clearly marked” (World Economic Forum, 2017, p. 
7). 
Political Systems. To measure operationalization of political 
structure and stability, I utilized the Polity IV Project, 
a constantly updated dataset supported by the Political 
Instability Task Force (Marshall et al., 2017; Polity Project, 
2017). In order to assess democracy and autocracy, the 
Polity IV Project utilizes factors such as competitiveness of 
political participation, openness of executive recruitment, 
and constraints on the chief executive (Marshall et al., 2017). 
I focused on whether a particular structure of government 
favors female prominence in its legislature in comparison to 
others. The -10 to +10 scale of individual country regime 
change does not limit countries by a selective number of 
categories and allows for discernible differences in scores. 
Some validity concerns may exist as scarce or missing data 
could alter the score positively or negatively in one direction. 
However, few reliability concerns threaten the measurement 
techniques of the Polity IV Project since “multiple historical 
sources were used for each country” and ambiguity was 
reviewed with special attention to questions of consistency 
(Marshall et al., 2017, p. 5). Intercoder reliability was 
maintained because the coding guidelines were applied in 
an undeviating manner by four individuals, even though the 
components were scored and weighed by hand. The data 
series “regularly examine[s] and often challenge[s] codings” 
by analysts and experts in academia, policy, and intelligence 
(Polity Project, 2017). These approaches increase confidence 
that the judgments do not reflect the views of one individual 
and if they do, the idiosyncrasies are explicit in the coding 
guidelines.
Gender Quotas. Legislated gender quotas are one of the fastest 
growing subfields of political science scholarship, as they 
are viewed as a solution to battling the primitive and oldest 
forms of inequality. To test this variable, I utilized the Gender 
Quotas Database maintained by the International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2019). The variable 
places countries on a scale ranging from “1-No Quotas, 
2-Legislated Candidate Quotas, 3-Reserved Seats, and 
4-Political Party Quotas” (International, 2019). I recoded 
this variable to combine the three classifications of gender 
quotas. Grouping one was recoded to represent a value of 
zero and groupings two, three, and four all received a score 
of one. This recoding was designed to clearly distinguish the 
countries with an established gender quota from those who 
have an absence of quotas. I hypothesized that countries 
with mandated gender quotas are likely to have more female 
representation in politics, so the alteration of my independent 
variable helps to make my prediction more striking. 
There were no obvious threats to validity or reliability since I 
eliminated the possibility of flawed or inaccurate methodology 
by recoding the variable. Even though there are three distinct 
types of gender quotas, they all have an identical objective 
of ensuring that women hold a critical minority of 30-40% 
in political representation. Grouping each classification 
of gender quotas into one system eliminates any threat to 
changes in the quota type from constitutional or legislative 
to voluntary overtime by centralizing on the existence of a 
quota in contrast to the specific nature of each quota type. 
As a whole, my research study has strong external validity. 
I selected data sources that have at least 120 cases out of 
195 and that reflect all geographic regions, government 
types, and systematic electoral decisions. I also used data 
from 2014-2019, which allowed access to the most accurate 
percentages, legislation, and constitutional changes. I was 
not able to calculate every variable that factors into female 
representation in government, but I chose the variables with 
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the largest pools of literature and combined some aspects of 
other variables, such as health and education, into existing 
independent variables.
I believe that my study has moderately strong internal validity, 
but lacks a substantial measure for wage parity and domestic 
roles. It may be difficult to prove that my independent 
variables came before my dependent variables, and some 
relationships may prove to be spurious. For example, it may 
be challenging to determine if fewer women are represented 
in politics due to disparities in wages and lack of ambition, 
or if wage disparities exist because there are no women in 
politics to change legislation and mandate that both genders 
be paid the same for equal work. 
Control Variable
Due to the nature of my empirical research, a control variable 
would have no major effect on the relationships between my 
dependent variable and the four independent variables, and 
would not be the cause of a spurious relationship. It would 
also be impossible for a country to possess a value of zero 
for each variable. While a country could have a value of zero 
for the variable of gender quotas (signifying the absence of 
a quota), no country exists that has a value of zero for the 
variable of wage parity. For example, Burundi has the highest 
level of parity, with a value of .911, and Syria holds the highest 
level of imparity, with a value of .274 (World Economic 
Forum, 2017, pp. 10-11). Palazzolo (n.d.) suggests that “if 
there are fewer than 1,000 cases, it will be very difficult to 
test a control variable,” and my study only has 120 cases.
Results and Discussion
Domestic Roles 
My regression analysis showed that domestic roles, as defined 
using the GII, have an extremely significant relationship (.000 
significance level) to the percentage of occupied seats held by 
women in parliaments (see Table 1). Due to the extensive 
literature on domestic roles in relation to gender stereotypes, 
sexism, and relation of emotion to lack of ability, it makes 
sense that this relationship proved significant, although I 
did not predict that it would be as significant as it was. The 
unstandardized regression coefficient for the GII (-20.522) 
supports my hypothesis that there is a negative relationship 
between the variables. In a general sense, unstandardized B is 
used to determine the direction of the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables. As the value of the 
independent variable increases, the dependent variable either 
increases or decreases. In my analysis, as the numerical value 
of the GII increases, the percentage of women represented in 
national Parliaments decreases.
Standardized B helps determine the strength of the 
relationship. Higher values indicate a stronger relationship 
and lower values indicate a weaker relationship. The 
standardized regression coefficient for Domestic Roles (-.337) 
is the largest coefficient in my analysis, which validates that 
Domestic Roles has the strongest influence on the amount 
of women gaining access to seats in parliaments in relation 
to my other independent variables. Despite having the most 
prominence on my dependent variable, the standardized 
coefficient value of -.337 establishes that the strength of 
the relationship is moderately strong and may not have as 
great of an influence in determining prediction of women’s 
representation in politics as I predicted.
Table 1: Regression Analysis of Relationships Between 
Independent Variables and the Percentage of Seats Held by 
Women in Single or Lower House Parliments.
Note. Dependent variable: percentage of occupied seats held 
by women in parliaments. N=120; 120 of 195 possible 
counties were utilized in this study. R2=.267
*Significant at .05
Wage Parity
My regression analysis also showed that Wage Parity was 
very significant (.005 significance level). Additionally, the 
unstandardized regression coefficient of 23.446 supports my 
hypothesis that countries with higher levels of wage parity 
will have a greater representation of women in the legisla-
ture. However, the standardized regression coefficient of .259 
highlights that the relationship between wage parity and 
women’s political representation is weak, which could be a 
result of a poor measurement. Although the GGGI captures 
the idea of wage equality for similar work, it also emphasizes 
the value of work, which could distort statistical analyses of 
wage inequality. The weak standardized regression coefficient 
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could also be the result of a non-causal relationship where 
fewer women are represented in parliaments not because of 
wage disparities and indifference, but because of the lack of 
a female presence in policy-making mandating higher wage 
parity. Moreover, the Pearson correlation value of -.375 sug-
gests that, despite uncertainty in the literature, the methods 
used for Domestic Roles and Wage Parity do not result in 
multicollinearity. In other words, the low strength of the as-
sociation for Domestic Roles and Wage Parity suggests that 
there are few intercorrelations or inter-associations between 
the two variables.
Political Systems 
My results revealed that the relationship between women’s 
political representation and political systems was extremely 
insignificant (.969 significance level), which does not support 
my hypothesis. The unstandardized coefficient of .007 shows 
that when there is a 20 unit increase in the polity scale 
(difference between -10 and +10), the percent of women 
occupying seats in Parliament only increases by .14%. This 
mathematical computation explains that a one unit increase 
in polity (going from the most autocratic regime to the most 
democratic regime) improves the percentage of women 
in politics, but by an extremely small and unimpactful 
amount. This idea correlates with the standardized regression 
coefficient of .004, which is exceedingly weak. 
Since my literature review did not reveal a consensus that 
political systems that are more democratic will have a 
higher percentage of women represented in politics, it is not 
surprising that the independent variable is very weak and not 
significant. Reynolds (1999) highlighted that “democracy 
in itself is not necessarily a precursor to the presence of 
substantial numbers of women in political life,” but is 
instead a familiarity with more women in positions of power 
and acceptance of women as leaders (p. 572). Similarly, Rule 
(1994) drew upon the work of Haavio-Mannila, articulating 
that variation in “women’s parliamentary representation 
in long-established but ‘unfinished democracies’” are 
caused “primarily [by] the electoral arrangements by which 
legislators are chosen” (p. 689). Rule explained that these 
electoral “arrangements are amenable to change faster 
than social biases and other barriers to women’s election 
opportunity and fair representation” (p. 689). On the other 
hand, case studies and qualitative evidence support the idea 
that the “effect of ideology is substantially stronger than the 
effects of political variables” (Paxton, 2003, p. 88). 
Gender Quotas
The regression analysis showed that the relationship between 
gender quotas and women’s representation in politics is 
extremely significant (.001 significance level). These findings 
support my hypothesis that countries with implemented 
gender quotas have a higher percentage of women in politics, 
which implies a growth in support and opportunities for 
female candidates and a decline in political institutions with 
high levels of male dominance and power. 
Although my standardized regression coefficient of .273 
for Gender Quotas is not very strong, some scholars have 
highlighted that of the top 20 countries in terms of female 
representation in government, 17 of them utilize some sort 
of a gender quota (International, 2019; IPU, 2017a). These 
findings suggest that the results of implemented gender 
quotas go far beyond statistical analysis. Comparatively, 
the implementation of gender quotas increases women’s 
representation in politics by 6.124% on a zero to one scale, 
where a value of zero is representative of the absence of a 
quota and a value of one is representative of the existence of 
a gender quota. 
Conclusion
The greatest obstacle when trying to accurately determine 
the causes of the current state of women’s political (under)
representation was the time restriction and limited availability 
of resources. Increased time and resources would allow me 
to find better measures for variables, particularly domestic 
roles and wage parity, which could in turn produce more 
accurate and significant results. More specifically, a more 
valid measurement for distinguishing economic participation 
and opportunity and whether a country has mandated wage 
parity legislation could be created. Additional research would 
allow me to include additional variables or gather my own 
data. This could possibly produce more substantial results 
that would assist future researchers and scholars looking to 
solve the causes of this socio-structural and cultural issue.
My main empirical findings were the significant correlations 
between three of my independent variables and the 
percentage of single or lower chamber parliamentary seats 
occupied by women. More explicitly, I found that Domestic 
Roles—which measures the dimensions of reproductive 
health, empowerment, and economic status—had the 
greatest impact on a country’s number of women represented 
in the national parliament. Gender inequality was also the 
most significant variable as a determinant of the prevalence 
of traditionalistic attitudes and domestic roles. An additional 
finding was the R-squared value of .267. R-squared—
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the coefficient of determination—is the proportion of 
variance in the dependent variable that is predicted from 
the independent variable. In my study, the R-squared 
value of .267 signifies that 26.7% of the causes of female 
representation in politics were explained by the four variables 
in my regression. Although this number only explains 
roughly a quarter of the research question I am trying to 
solve, it shows that the carefully selected variables and forms 
of measurement do in fact help explain variation in women’s 
political representation.
My careful selection of variables allowed 120 cases using 
countries as the unit of analysis to truly encompass the 
diversity and complexity of the global spectrum. It is 
important to acknowledge that the Political Systems 
variable did not prove to be significant and that I omitted 
variables such as educational attainment, media influence, 
and militarism due to a “lack of data” and consensus in the 
literature on a cross-national scale (Matland, 1998, p. 110). 
Matland (1998) in “Women’s Representation in National 
Legislatures: Developed and Developing Countries” suggested 
that “considerable work remains to be done” across nations. 
While “evidence of systems for women’s electoral success [are] 
consistent and striking,” a “minimum development level is 
needed to create a foundation for other variables to have an 
effect” (Kenworthy & Malami, 1999, pp. 261-262; Matland, 
1998, p. 120). As the level of development increases, “more 
women start to acquire the resources needed to become 
politically relevant, resources such as education, salaried 
labor force experience, and training in the professions that 
dominate politics (such as law)” (Matland, 1998, p. 120).
While the regression analysis revealed significant relationships 
between certain independent variables and women’s 
representation in politics, the results are in no way absolute. 
The addition of new independent variables may cause a 
variable that was once significant to become unsubstantial 
and vice versa. Measurements used for Domestic Roles and 
Wage Parity were not ideal, and the moderately strong and 
weak relationships were established by the lack of validity 
in the measures. Moreover, the results for Political Systems 
using the Polity IV Project demonstrate that while the 
measure may not have lacked reliability or validity,  perhaps 
there really is no relationship between political systems and 
the amount of women represented in respective parliaments. 
My R-squared value of .267 emphasizes that there is still 
much to learn and discover about this subject matter and 
that more in-depth research and analysis is necessary. 
With more time and resources, I would calculate which 
countries mandate equal pay and which countries do not in 
order to create a binary response with no flexibility. I would 
also study the characteristics of country leaders to determine 
whether there is diversity in the women represented or if they 
all advocate for the same issues, members of similar parties, 
from similar backgrounds, etc. It would be interesting to 
see how the portrayal of women in the media influences 
willingness to select female candidates, especially with 
respect to recent literature about female politicians regarding 
their appearance and other physical characteristics.
This research paper could foreshadow case study analysis 
of countries with implemented gender quotas compared to 
those with an absence of quotas or could facilitate discussion 
on the effectiveness of a quota within a single country. Some 
of these debates could examine whether quotas generate 
cultural, attitudinal, or behavioral shifts among citizens. 
In The Impact of Gender Quotas, Franceschet et al. (2012) 
reflected on the idea that quotas may “reinforce a gendered 
division of labor in parliament whereby women work on 
less prestigious social issues, while men focus on policy areas 
traditionally deemed more important” (p. 230). My findings 
can illuminate the complexity of the quota question and can 
contribute to a second generation of quota research.
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MOVE:
Philadelphia’s Forgotten Bombing
Charles Abraham
“Philadelphia Free the MOVE 9 Forum” by Joe Piette is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
On May 13, 1985, the city of Philadelphia erupted into flames. Under the orders of Mayor Wilson Goode, the 
Philadelphia Police Department dropped a bomb onto the row house containing MOVE, a cult-like organization, 
on Osage Avenue in West Philadelphia. The resulting fire killed eleven people, including five children, and burned 
down sixty-one houses. By examining newspaper articles on MOVE, the bombing by the Philadelphia Police, and 
the public’s response, this paper investigates how Mayor Goode was able to continue his political career and how 
this bombing has faded into obscurity outside of the city. The media’s attitude and reporting on MOVE, the city’s 
lack of connection with MOVE’s beliefs, and the efforts of the city government to move on from the bombing 
have caused this tragedy to become largely forgotten.
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In a fortified row house in West Philadelphia, a bomb 
dropped by Philadelphia Police killed eleven MOVE 
members, including five children, and burned down sixty-
one her houses after a lengthy standoff between the two 
groups. MOVE is a cult-like organization which eschewed 
technology, medicine and western clothing, where members 
lived communally, ate raw food, left garbage on their yards, 
and proselytized with a loudspeaker, frustrating the residents 
of Osage Avenue. The MOVE bombing, remembered as 
“May 13, 1985” in West Philadelphia, was the first time a 
U.S. city bombed itself, and it could have been a pivotal 
moment in the mayoral reign of Wilson Goode and for 
the city of brotherly love. Instead, the bombing has faded 
into obscurity, with only minimal consequences for the 
city government and for the city. Public antipathy and the 
efforts of the city government to move on from the bombing, 
revealed and even enabled by media reporting, have caused 
this tragedy to become largely forgotten.1
MOVE: The Organization
Vincent Leaphart founded the American Christian Move-
ment for Life, later shortened to MOVE, in 1972 in West 
Philadelphia and changed his name to John Africa. MOVE 
was primarily a black organization, although white people 
could join as well. As an anti-establishment and anti-tech-
nology group, its members ate a diet of only raw fruits, vege-
     1 For further reading on cults in America, see Willa Appel, Cults in America: 
Programmed for Paradise (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983), which 
discusses the phenomenon of cults and how one is indoctrinated or breaks out of 
a cult. For further reading on African Americans in mid-20th century America see 
Dorothy K. Newman et al., Protest, Politics and Prosperity: Black Americans and White 
Institutions, 1940-1975 (New York: Pantheon, 1978) or Annette Gordon-Reed, ed., 
Race on Trial: Law and Justice in American History (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), which discuss how African Americans were treated by the police and 
in the court as well as other white-dominated institutions during this period. For 
more on MOVE, see J.M. Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts: 
MOVE as Revolutionary Black Humanism,” The Black Scholar 32, no.1 (Spring 
2002): 11-21, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41068961, which argues MOVE was a 
radical and religious group that exemplified revolutionary black humanist thinking. 
For more on the effect of the media on the perception of MOVE, see Kimberly 
Sanders and Judson Jeffries, “Framing MOVE: A Press’ Complicity in the Murder 
of Women and Children in the City of (Un) Brotherly Love,” Journal of African 
American Studies 17, no. 4 (December 2013): 566-586, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12111-013-9252-7, which discusses how press coverage led to antipathy towards 
the MOVE organization. For more on the MOVE bombing and its aftermath, see 
Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction: The City of Philadelphia versus 
MOVE (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Hizkias Assefa, Extremist 
Groups and Conflict Resolution: The MOVE Crisis in Philadelphia (New York: 
Praeger, 1988); Margot Harry, “Attention MOVE—This is America!” Sage Journals 
28, no. 4 (April 1987): 5-28, https://doi.org/10.1177/030639688702800402; 
Georgia A. Persons, “The Philadelphia MOVE Incident as an Anomaly in Models 
of Mayoral Leadership,” Phylon 48, no. 4 (December 1987): 249-260, https://doi.
org/10.2307/274482; or John Anderson and Hilary Hevenor, Burning Down the 
House: MOVE and the Tragedy of Philadelphia (New York: Norton, 1987), which 
all discuss the bombing and how it affected Philadelphia and the city government. 
The Philadelphia Inquirer reported on MOVE and the bombing from 1985-
1987. Temple University Library Special Collections houses the records of the 
Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission regarding the MOVE bombing and 
its antecedents. 
tables, nuts, and eggs; used no medicine or western clothing; 
disposed of their garbage in the yard; and used outhouses 
instead of conventional toilets. The children of MOVE were 
not allowed to attend school and had never eaten cooked 
food or watched television. These were the first “pure” 
members of MOVE: they were raised to never be exposed 
to the corrupting influences of social and political institu-
tions. Members protested outside of zoos and pet stores, 
which often led to arrests though the police did not believe 
MOVE was even potentially violent during the early 1970s.2
The MOVE  bombing, 
remembered as “May 13, 1985“ 
in West Philadelphia, 
was the first time a U.S. city 
bombed itself.
The other residents of Powelton Village did not hold a 
great opinion of MOVE, which lived communally in three 
townhouses in the neighborhood. Powelton Village, located 
near Drexel University and the University of Pennsylvania, 
was a diverse and tolerant community and a haven for 
political activists. In 1976, neighbors began complaining 
about children playing in the yard without diapers and 
in unsanitary conditions. The complaints of Powelton 
residents’ and MOVE’s campaign against police brutality 
caused the Philadelphia Police Department to set up 24-
hour surveillance on the MOVE townhouses, fueling their 
belief that they were being targeted by the police. The next 
year, MOVE members began to sit out on the porch holding 
rifles, wearing berets, and using loudspeakers to lecture their 
neighbors. MOVE already held a reputation as a radical 
black organization, much like the Black Panthers, because 
of MOVE’s emergence during the “Black Power” era. Many 
people in Philadelphia believed the public display of weapons 
to be the start of the organization becoming more militant.3
Tensions between the city and MOVE began to rise as 
neighbors in Powelton continued complaining about 
MOVE’s actions and as the police department’s surveillance 
began to infuriate the organization. Between 1977 and 
1978, MOVE placed bomb-timing devices, though no 
explosives, in several hotels across the nation as well as in 
     2 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 27-29; Sanders and Jeffries, 
“Framing MOVE,” 568; Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts,” 
13; Jack N. Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles to Administrative Responsibility: 
Lessons of the MOVE Disaster,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 10, no. 
1 (Winter 1991): 2-3, https://doi.org/10.2307/3325510; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 
14-15. 
     3 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 29-31; Nagel, “Psychological 
Obstacles,” 3-4; Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts,” 11-21. 
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London.4 These devices were left with threatening letters 
stating that MOVE would strike for real unless Philadelphia 
stopped its harassment. The organization had begun a feud 
with then-Mayor Frank Rizzo, who had previously served as 
Philadelphia’s Police Commissioner and run for mayor on 
a law-and-order campaign. MOVE’s residency in Powelton 
Village came to a head in 1978 after an agreement between 
the organization and the city made on May 5 disintegrated. 
The city and MOVE had agreed that the city would end 
the blockade and within 90 days MOVE members would 
relocate to a residence outside the city. MOVE saw the city 
as the center of the societal corruption they sought to end 
and stayed past the 90-day limit. While several organizations 
active in Powelton Village at the time were either pro-MOVE 
or supported negotiation with MOVE to allow them to stay 
in the neighborhood, MOVE and the police engaged in a 
protracted firefight resulting in the death of one policeman, 
Officer James Ramp, and the sentencing of nine MOVE 
members to jail for the officer’s death.5 
The policy of non-confrontation 
and avoidance proved 
ineffective, and in 1984 the 
Philadelphia Police began to 
plan a course of action against 
MOVE.
After being forced out of Powelton Village, MOVE took 
up residence in a row house on Osage Avenue in Cobbs 
Creek, West Philadelphia. At first, the organization and the 
residents of Osage Avenue coexisted peacefully. In time, 
however, tensions began to as lifestyle differences emerged 
and the neighbors began complaining. MOVE removed the 
flea collars off of their neighbors’ pets, collected and fed wild 
animals, built pigeon coops, and left their refuse outside 
in their yard. Most distressing to Osage Avenue residents 
was that the MOVE children appeared to be malnourished 
and rummaged through their trash looking for food. The 
neighbors were told Wilson Goode would help them after 
he had become mayor, but in late 1983 after the mayoral 
election, MOVE began to use bullhorns and loudspeakers to 
harass their neighbors.6 
    4 While MOVE left these letters and devices across the nation and interna-
tionally, they were still only an organization local to Philadelphia and were not 
expanding nationally.
     5 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 30-32; Nagel, “Psychological 
Obstacles,” 16; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 20-37. Nine members of MOVE were 
convicted in the shooting of Officer James Ramp during the 1978 shootout 
with the police and were sentenced with thirty to one hundred years in prison. 
Thesemembers are known collectively as “The MOVE 9.”
     6 Assefa, Extremist Groups, 102-108; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles” 5.
MOVE believed Mayor Goode had the ability to release 
the jailed MOVE 9 members, and they knew if they 
began to harass residents of Osage Avenue—a middle-
class neighborhood and the bedrock of Goode’s political 
support—the city would have to pay attention to them. 
Despite MOVE holding the block hostage, Goode used 
apolicy of “appeasement, non-confrontation and avoidance,” 
attempting to avoid conflict in any way possible.7 City 
Operating Departments—Health, Water, Human Services, 
Streets, and Licences and Inspections—were barred by city 
policy from carrying out their responsibilities at the MOVE 
row house. City officials believed that once MOVE members 
realized the city was ignoring them, they would either change 
their belligerent behavior or leave the city. The policy of
non-confrontation and avoidance proved ineffective, and in 
1984 the Philadelphia Police began to plan a course of action 
against MOVE, one of the first signs of what was to come.8
May 13, 1985
Mayor Goode told the police he needed a plan of action 
against MOVE in the spring of 1985. He wanted to explore 
the possibilities of arresting some MOVE members and 
obtaining a court order to hold the children. MOVE began 
fortifying their row house in earnest in the fall of 1984 and 
the winter of 1985, building a bunker made of railroad 
ties, logs, and steel plates on the top of their house; they 
used similar material to fortify the walls. In April 1985, 
they announced with bullhorns their intentions to kill the 
mayor or any police officer who approached the fortified 
house. Neighbors threatened to take matters into their own 
hands after claiming to have seen men with rifles on the 
roof and in the bunker of the house. On the morning of 
May 13, 1985, the police attempted to serve warrants for 
the arrests of four MOVE members. These warrants were for 
misdemeanor charges and primarily intended to get them 
out of the neighborhood. Mayor Goode required that any 
officers involved in the 1978 shooting not be involved in 
the operation on Osage Avenue, but several of those officers 
were present in the assault force. At 5:30 a.m. outside the 
MOVE row house, police used a bullhorn to announce the 
names of the members to be arrested for illegal possession 
of explosives and terroristic threats and gave the members 
fifteen minutes to surrender. MOVE refused. Police insertion 
teams then entered the houses on either side. In response, 
MOVE shot at the police force from inside. Over the next 
hour and a half, the Philadelphia police fired over 10,000 
     7 “Excerpts from Commission’s Report on Bombing,” New York Times, March 
7, 1986.
     8 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 32, 82-85; Nagel, “Psychological 
Obstacles,” 7; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 110-111; Persons, “The Philadelphia 
MOVE Incident,” 255.
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rounds of ammunition on the row house and used explosives 
to blow holes in the walls. By 10:40 a.m., the front of the 
house was destroyed, but the fortifications MOVE installed 
in the winter had held, preventing the police from seizing the 
house. When it became clear their tactics had failed, Mayor 
Goode announced during a televised press conference he 
would take the house by any means necessary.9
After the press conference, the police sought another way 
to force the eleven people out of the house that included 
the use of explosives. They began assembling an explosive 
entry device around 4:30 p.m., and around thirty minutes 
later, Mayor Goode approved the use of the entry device. At 
5:27 p.m., the police dropped an explosive package from a 
helicopter onto the bunker of the house. When the bomb 
exploded, it did not remove the bunker; rather, it ignited 
a gasoline tank. Instead of trying to contain the resulting 
blaze, the police and fire commissioners let the bunker burn. 
It was not until 6:32 p.m. that the fire department turned 
on its hoses, and it was not until 9:30 p.m. that they took 
more active steps to contain the fire. The fire raged on until 
11:41 p.m., engulfing 61 homes, damaging 110 additional 
houses, killing John Africa and the ten other occupants of 
the MOVE house, five of them children, and leaving 250 
men, women, and children homeless.10
Response to the MOVE Bombing
The bombing of the MOVE row house should have been 
a pivotal event in the history of Philadelphia, showing the 
incompetence of city officials in an explosive finale. Yet, after 
the bombing, Mayor Goode and the Philadelphia Police 
Department received support from around the country. The 
Los Angeles Police Chief at the time, Daryl Gates, defended 
the use of an explosive device, declaring it “a sound tactic.” 
Gates also stated that Mayor Goode had “provided some of 
the finest leadership [he had] ever seen from any politician” 
and that he hoped Mayor Goode “ran for national office.” 
Michael Nutter, then an assistant to a city councilman, 
said “[MOVE] is a group of people whose philosophy is 
based on conflict and confrontation.” Roy Innis, who was 
the chairman of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), 
called Mayor Goode’s handling of the crisis “heroic.” Tom 
Cremans, the former director of Accuracy Systems Inc., 
which sells munitions to police departments, said “the police 
exercised remarkable restraint in not using the device earlier.” 
However, the bomb squads of many cities were reluctant to 
    9 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 87-94; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 111-113; 
Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles,” 6-8.
     10 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 95-96; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 
113; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles,” 9.
comment on the incident, not wishing to criticize their 
fellow officers.11 
Despite those speaking in favor of the mayor and the 
Philadelphia Police Department, not all law enforcement 
officers were complimentary of Philadelphia’s handling of 
the MOVE crisis. The director of the American Federation 
of Police, Gerald Arenberg, believed “They broke every rule 
in the book” when it came to their handling of the incident.
James Fife, a police lieutenant in New York City, described it 
by saying, “They burned down the village to save the village” 
before adding that the actions taken by the Philadelphia 
Police Department were “really unheard of.” Arenberg stated 
the Philadelphia police “just weren’t using all the equipment 
available to any modern police department.” The MOVE 
bombing captured the attention of the world, and as many 
law enforcement agencies weighed in on the actions of the 
Philadelphia police, so too did the media, both national and 
international.12
Front pages of many 
newspapers showed pictures of 
smoldering row houses in West 
Philadelphia.
The media took a largely critical view of the incident and 
Mayor Goode. Many newspapers around the world were 
unsympathetic to the siege of the MOVE house and called 
Philadelphia a “war zone.” Front pages of many newspapers 
showed pictures of smoldering row houses in West 
Philadelphia. The Washington Post referred to the pictures 
as resembling “war-torn Beirut” and the New York Daily 
News called the bombing “a terrible, unnecessary, and costly 
blunder.” The bombing attracted international attention 
with newspapers in France paying considerable attention 
to the incident. The France-Soir had an aerial photo of the 
devastation, and Liberation, a French tabloid, called it “one 
of the most unbelievable urban guerrilla operations that 
America has ever known.” In Moscow, a newscaster reported 
“six dead, 60 houses destroyed, hundreds homeless—such is 
the sinister result of a bloody slaughter which was launched 
by police.” The San Francisco Chronicle was extremely 
      11 Ron Wolf, William K. Marimow, Steve Lopez, and John Woestendiek, “How 
the Bomb Decision Was Made,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 17, 1985; Tom Infield, 
Doreen Carvajal, and Robert J. Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened Fire: Sent Two 
Days Prior to Assault,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 20, 1985; William K. Stevens, 
“Police Drop Bomb on Radicals’ Home in Philadelphia,” New York Times, May 14, 
1985.
   12 Tim Weiner, “Experts on Police Procedure Criticize Bombing of House,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 15, 1985.
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harsh in its criticism, writing there was “no excuse” for the 
bombing and it was “an astonishing example of overkill.” 
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution was also critical, calling the 
bombing reckless and including comments from people such 
as Burton Caine, the president of the Philadelphia chapter of 
the American Civil Liberties Union, who called the bombing 
“totally unjustified,” and New York City mayor Edward 
Koch, who stated that “if [he] had a police commissioner 
so stupid to allow a bomb to be thrown into a house, [he] 
would remove him.” The Dallas Morning News focused on 
the residents of the 6200 block of Osage Avenue. Kevin 
Young called the bombing “unjustifiable” and said Osage 
Avenue “is not a battle zone.” Another resident said that he 
was “totally disgusted” with the city and how it had handled 
the crisis. These harsh comments about the administration 
and its actions were widespread after May 13, 1985 but only 
for a short period of time. The national news moved on after 
a few weeks of reporting on MOVE, and eventually only the 
Philadelphia Inquirer was doing any meaningful reporting on 
the aftermath of the bombing.13 
Despite all these critical reports, some newspapers were more 
supportive of Philadelphia and the mayor. The New York 
Times referred to MOVE as a radical group, focused more 
on the complaints from the neighbors against MOVE, and 
framed the incident as a city reacting against behavior that was 
well out of the norm for a working-class African American 
neighborhood. In the Times article, Dee Peoples, the owner of 
a store two blocks away from the MOVE house, said that “all 
you hear is aggression. You sleep with it, you wake up with it, 
you live with it.” The San Francisco Chronicle wrote about the 
group’s strange philosophy and how while it was, in theory, 
a “philosophy of anti-materialism, pacifism and concern for 
the environment,” in practice “its history was replete with 
violence, obscenity and filth.” The Chronicle article stated that 
former MOVE member Donald Glassey had testified John 
Africa “had planned an armed confrontation with police and 
had MOVE members make bombs and buy firearms.” The 
Lexington Herald-Leader, like the Times, described MOVE as 
a radical organization and defined the cause of the siege as 
MOVE refusing “to leave the house under an eviction order 
from police.” The Herald article also discussed neighbors’ 
complaints of “assaults, robberies, and a stench at the house.” 
The positive media surrounding the administration shielded 
it from dealing with the harsh realities of their actions and 
     13 Jane Eisner, “Media Blitz: West Philadelphia Disaster Makes Front-Page 
Headlines Around the World,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 16, 1985; “Police 
Overkill,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 15, 1985; “Police Tactics Questioned 
– Experts Call Use of Explosives in Siege Situations ‘Reckless,’” Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, May 15, 1985; “225 Left Homeless by Philadelphia Fire – Uprooted 
Residents Sorrowful, Angry; Mayor Defends MOVE Incident,” Dallas Morning 
News, May 15, 1985.
allowed it a reprieve from the negative media of the bombing. 
The Philadelphia administration’s actions during this crisis 
were highly criticized and opinion was divided among news 
sources in the city and around the globe, but it was a much 
different story among the Philadelphia public.14
The national news moved on 
after a few weeks of reporting 
on MOVE.
Many believed they were receiving biased news reports. One 
woman from Valley Forge stated she “believed the mayor 
did a commendable job,” and “[the press was] questioning 
the mayor too much.” Tourists visiting Philadelphia in the 
aftermath of the bombing had a similar reaction: “MOVE? It 
could have happened anywhere.” One resident of Northeast 
Philadelphia, Eli Teper, complained the police “used too 
little force” and “criminals should be treated as such.” 
Steward Beatty, also of Northeast Philadelphia, thought the 
bombing was justified and it was “nice to see that somebody 
can still make decisions instead of doing nothing.” Steve 
Harmon, a resident of West Philadelphia, said the bombing 
was “like Vietnam.” While the media and the police around 
the country were divided on the incident, most people in 
Philadelphia appeared to see it as a tragedy but remained 
supportive of the mayor and the city overall.15
The media’s discussion about the incident shifted closer to 
the view of the public. While it was a tragedy, most blame 
rested on the shoulders of MOVE. Two days before the 
bombing, MOVE sent a letter threatening to set fire to their 
row house and the neighboring house should the police 
attack. This letter began, “If MOVE go down, not only will 
everyone in this block go down, the knee joints of America 
will break and the body of America will soon fall.” Then the 
letter threatened, “Before we let you mutha f-s [sic] make 
an example of us we will burn this mutha f-in [sic] house 
down and burn you all up with us.” The city administration 
began using the letter to blame MOVE for setting the fire 
that burned down sixty-one houses and killed eleven people. 
Police Commissioner Gregore Sambor stated it was his 
“personal opinion” that MOVE “started or assisted” the fire, 
and was “convinced that MOVE people saturated those roofs 
with gasoline.” Mayor Goode said the letter showed MOVE 
was “a group that was bent on absolute destruction, a group 
   14 Eisner, “Media Blitz”; Stevens, “Police Drop Bomb”; “MOVE’s Strange 
Philosophy of Militancy and Escapism,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 15, 1985; 
“Radical Group Holds Police at Bay,” Lexington Herald-Leader, May 14, 1985.
       15  Joyce Gemperlein, “Visitors Say the City’s Image Will Survive,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, May 19, 1985; Stevens, “Police Drop Bomb.”
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that was, in fact, a guerilla group inside an urban area.” The 
mayor also stated that the release of the letter was not meant 
as evidence that MOVE started the fire but that the letter 
“says what it says, in [his] opinion.”16
The city attempted to paint MOVE 
as the agressor, framing the 
actions they had undertaken as 
merely providing law and order.
In lockstep with the theory of MOVE burning down the 
street, the city began to discuss how the entry device used 
was extremely safe and could not have caused the fire. 
The explosive used in the bombing was known as Tovex 
TR-2, manufactured by the DuPont Company, which 
described Tovex TR-2 as “one of the safest explosives on 
the market.” Before the decision to use Tovex on the house, 
the Philadelphia Police Department secretly tested different 
explosives on lumber structures; however, Tovex TR-2 was not 
meant for above-ground buildings but was instead developed 
primarily for underground mining. The media began to use 
the DuPont Company’s label of Tovex as an extremely safe 
explosive to push the idea that the fire was not the fault of the 
city. Mayor Goode took issue with the word “bomb” as well, 
explaining that “what [he] approved to be used was an entry 
device, which was to take and somehow remove the bunker 
from the top of the house. There was no intent to destroy the 
house.” The city attempted to paint MOVE as the aggressor, 
thereby framing the actions they had undertaken as merely 
providing law and order, despite it being clear that the 
aggression towards MOVE was excessive.17
Shortly after the bombing, and amid calls for an official 
investigation into the administration’s actions, Mayor Goode 
announced his intentions to create a special commission to 
examine the incident. William J. Green, Mayor Goode’s 
predecessor, said the MOVE Special Commission “has 
serious, tough questions to ask [the] administration about how 
it conducted itself,” and “there are many, many unanswered 
questions and in some cases contradictions that cannot and 
should not and must not, if faith is to be restored, be swept 
under the rug.” The former mayor also said the city should 
release the police intelligence files on MOVE so “everyone 
in Philadelphia would know what the premise of [the] 
decisions were.” Despite Green’s harsh words on the city’s 
actions, Robert S. Hurst, then-president of Lodge 5 of the 
      16 Infield, Carvajal, and Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened Fire.”
      17 Wolf, Marimow, Lopez, and Woestendiek, “How the Bomb Decision Was 
Made”; Infield, Carvajal, and Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened.” 
Fraternal Order of Police, said “the ultimate responsibility of 
the widespread property destruction remains squarely on the 
members of this terrorist organization known as MOVE,” 
and public opinion in Philadelphia supported this idea. In 
a poll conducted by Teichner Associates of Philadelphia, 71 
percent of respondents believed the mayor did a good or 
excellent job dealing with MOVE.18
The MOVE Special Commission hired several people to
conduct the investigation. James R. Phelan, one of the FBI’s 
explosive and counterespionage experts before he left the 
bureau two years earlier, and Charles King, an expert in 
the cause and spread of fires, were brought in to investigate 
the explosives used in the bombing. The original report on 
the explosive device indicated the only explosive used was 
Tovex TR-2. However, three months after the incident, 
Officer William C. Klein testified he had included a second 
explosive, C-4, in the device when he had assembled it. The 
commission also hired six other investigators to work under 
the lead investigator, Neil P. Shanahan. These investigators 
came from Connecticut, Chicago, Virginia, and Maryland, 
as well as the Philadelphia area. William H. Brown III, 
chairman of the commission, said the “search for the 
highest-quality, professional investigators [was] long and 
wide-ranging.” Brown added these investigators brought “the 
skills and expertise essential for the investigation to fulfill 
its mandate.” The investigators specialized in anti-terrorist 
programs, major violent crime, and homicide. As the inquiry 
continued, it became very critical of how the city managed 
the MOVE incident.19
As the MOVE Commission’s hearings occurred, the 
testimonies began to paint Mayor Goode in an unflattering 
light. In his testimony, the mayor portrayed himself as 
misinformed and misled by his subordinates, claiming he was 
as much a victim as a leader. He depicted himself as a leader 
who confirmed the decisions others made. This was odd, as 
Goode’s managing style as both city manager and mayor was 
very detail oriented. An assistant to the District Attorney, 
Bernard L. Siegel, testified before the grand jury that he had 
heard “the mayor [say] to the police commissioner, ‘You are 
the professional and you need not keep me advised of all 
the details.’” When the District Attorney, Ed Rendell, was 
asked about this statement, he thought it was “somewhat 
unusual for Wilson [Goode]” before adding that the mayor’s 
“management style has always been to get involved in all 
the significant details.” The hearing revealed the mayor’s 
     18 Larry Eichel and Robin Clark, “MOVE Death Toll Reaches 11; Goode to 
Pick Panel for Probe,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 16, 1985.
     19 Larry Eichel, “MOVE Commission Hires Former FBI Explosives Expert,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, September 6, 1985; Larry Eichel, “Commission Hires 6 
Investigators,” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 19, 1985.
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attempts to distance himself from the MOVE incident as 
it was occurring by purposefully asking to not get all the 
details. This opened Goode up to considerable criticism, the 
most significant from former mayor William Green, who 
said Goode was pushing a theory of “reverse Nuremberg” 
responsibility: he could not be responsible for the incident 
because he had only accepted the recommendations from his 
subordinates. Charles Bowser, a member of the commission, 
criticized Goode in a less direct way, stating “the only 
person who had the foggiest notion of what was going to 
happen when the bomb dropped was a police lieutenant.” 
While these hearings demonstrated there was a major issue 
between MOVE and the other residents of the 6200 block 
of Osage Avenue, they also showed there had been poor 
communication, inaccurate or incomplete intelligence on 
the organization, and incompetent leadership.20
When the MOVE Special Commission reached a decision 
on the actions of the administration and the police, its 
report stated Mayor Goode and his administration displayed 
“reckless disregard for life and property.” The report 
stated, “dropping a bomb on an occupied row house was 
unconscionable and should have been rejected out of hand,” 
and “the plan to drop the bomb was reckless, ill-conceived, 
and hastily approved.” Commissioner Gregore Sambor and 
Managing Director Leo A. Brooks were declared “grossly 
negligent” for not calling off the siege. The report also 
called the mayor “grossly negligent” and said he “clearly 
risked the lives” of the children who had been killed in the 
house and this was “unjustified homicide.” The commission 
found that the mayor “failed to perform his responsibility 
as the city’s chief executive by not actively participating in 
the preparation, review, and oversight of the plan.” Goode 
“abdicated his responsibilities as a leader when, after midday, 
he permitted a clearly failed operation to continue [at] great 
risk to life and property.” Despite believing MOVE to be 
an “authoritarian, violence-threatening cult,” the report 
declared the 10,000 rounds of ammunition fired into the 
row house had been “excessive and unreasonable,” and “the 
failure of those responsible for the firing to control or stop 
such an excessive amount of force was unconscionable,” 
especially with children inside the building.21
Mayor Goode After MOVE
The MOVE Special Commission’s harsh criticisms of Mayor 
Goode were labeled as devastating by allies of the mayor, but 
the newspaper coverage of the report was largely supportive. 
    20 Larry Eichel, “D.A.: Goode Wanted No Details; Rendell Testifies on MOVE,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, October 23, 1985. 
     21 Thomas Ferrick Jr., “Report on MOVE Finds Goode ‘Grossly Negligent’ in 
Decisions: Children’s ‘Homicide’ Is Alleged,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 2, 1986.
An editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer, written shortly 
after the report was released, stated the author “[disagreed] 
with those who think Wilson Goode should resign” and 
noted Philadelphians should not just judge the mayor on 
the MOVE incident, but should instead “judge him on his 
entire first term.” Mayor Goode also received support from 
his church followers after the report. The Inquirer reported 
“more than 250 people […] gathered to pray for Mayor 
Goode,” and the Reverend U. O. Ifill Sr. described the 
prayer services as “a demonstration of the endemic support 
the mayor has in the black community.” Despite the findings 
of the MOVE Special Commission, Mayor Goode’s support 
in the city stayed strong and grew thanks to these efforts by 
local organizations and newspapers. This outcry of support 
for the mayor hid the actions he had taken and lessened the 
loss of life in the most important event of his career.22
Despite the findings of the MOVE 
Special Commission, Mayor 
Goode’s support in the city 
stayed strong.
In the years after the MOVE disaster, Wilson Goode’s 
reputation began to recover. Over a year after the MOVE 
incident, Goode said that “[he] had some difficult days and 
difficult times in [his] administration, but [he had] done a 
lot of good, constructive things.” John F. White Jr., a city 
councilman, said “the administration has demonstrated far 
more experience over [the] year.” The incident faded from 
public memory, overshadowed by Goode’s more successful 
endeavors, such as ending a strike involving 14,000 city 
employees, which created more confidence in him and his 
administration. When the city experienced a major trash 
and sanitation issue, Mayor Goode proposed a trash-to-
steam plant to be built in the Philadelphia Navy Yard. When 
several police officers were arrested on bribery and corruption 
charges, Mayor Goode helped restore the department by 
implementing a reform package. In the initial aftermath of 
the MOVE disaster, it seemed that Goode’s political career 
was over, but over the following two years he worked tirelessly 
to repair his image.23
    22 Acel Moore, “Bringing on the Problems: Wilson Goode Sometimes Is His 
Own Worst Enemy,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 20, 1986; Russell Cooke, 
“Praying for Goode: The Faithful Rise Up,” Philadelphia Inquirer, April 13, 1986. 
     23 Russell Cooke, “For Goode, A Year of Recovery,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 
January 4, 1987; Robin Clark, “Police Reforms Unveiled: Goode Begins Search 
for Chief,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 20, 1985; Ferrick Jr., “Report on 
MOVE.”
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In 1988, Goode ran for reelection against former mayor and 
police commissioner Frank Rizzo. It was a highly contested 
election, with only a slim margin of 17,176 votes out of 
652,307 total votes. In Rizzo’s concession, he warned Goode 
that he would “have to deliver or [he is] going to be right 
on him.” Despite the bad publicity that his actions against 
MOVE had brought him, the good publicity he had received 
since allowed Goode to rehabilitate his image and beat Rizzo 
to become mayor for his second term.  Goode’s reelection 
shows how successfully MOVE and the MOVE bombing 
had been removed from the public eye; even though nothing 
truly changed after the bombing, people had moved on.24 
Thirty Years Later
Thirty years after the MOVE bombing, National Public 
Radio looked back at MOVE and learned that many young 
Philadelphians never even knew it had occurred. Tasneema 
Raja, an editor on an NPR show who grew up only twenty 
minutes north of Philadelphia, never learned about MOVE 
in class but instead learned about it from her father. 
NPR’s Gene Demby, who grew up in South Philadelphia 
in the 1980s, also never discussed MOVE in class. Robin 
Wagner-Pacifici, who studies fringe radical groups at New 
York City’s New School, believes that other radical groups 
never identified with MOVE’s anti-technology, pro-animal 
rights, and quasi-Rastafarian beliefs, leading the group to be 
forgotten in discussions of radical groups. Groups similar to 
the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, and the Weaver family 
in Ruby Ridge, Idaho, held overlapping beliefs and would 
mention each other in their manifestos, but “none of them 
mentioned MOVE.” Unlike the Branch Davidians who 
faced off against the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms, or the Weaver Family who were besieged by the 
FBI, the Philadelphia police department bombed MOVE. 
This was not a showdown between a fringe radical group and 
the federal government, but with the local government. A 
lack of connection between the general public and MOVE’s 
core beliefs, as well as the city’s general ambivalence toward 
the group, caused the MOVE bombing to fade into obscurity. 
MOVE generally has only one article written on it each year, 
usually on the anniversary of the bombing or about the 
MOVE 9, and only receives minor mention in articles about 
events the group attends. This relative obscurity compared 
to the other extremist groups has caused the fallout of the 
bombing to be forgotten.25
     24 Christopher Hepp and H. G. Bissinger, “Rizzo Concedes Defeat: Says He’ll Remain 
Active in Politics,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 24, 1987.
    25 Gene Demby, “I’m From Philly. 30 Years Later, I’m Still Trying to Make Sense of 
the MOVE Bombing,” National Public Radio, May 13, 2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2015/05/13/406243272/im-from-philly-30-years-later-im-still-trying-to-make-
sense-of-the-move-bombing. Gene Demby, “Why Have So Many People Never Heard o f 
the MOVE Bombing?” National Public Radio, May 18, 2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2015/05/18/407665820/why-did-we-forget-the-move-bombing.
Conclusion
Goode’s victory over Rizzo for a second term as mayor was 
the first sign that the MOVE incident held minimal lasting 
significance to the city outside of Osage Avenue. The second 
sign was that schools in Philadelphia do not teach about 
MOVE; children living in Philadelphia do not learn about 
an event where the mayor bombs his own city. The MOVE 
bombing should have ended Wilson Goode’s political career, 
as well as the careers of the others involved in the decision-
making that led to the siege of the MOVE row house and 
subsequent bombing of its bunker. This should have been an 
event woven into the very fabric of the city; instead, it was 
forgotten—the perpetrators remained in office and repaired 
their image, and their victims faded into obscurity. Nothing 
significant changed after the MOVE bombing: there were no 
major changes to policy or regulations in response to MOVE 
or police actions, and for the residents of Osage Avenue all 
they received was a city bombing their homes.26
This should have been an event 
woven into the very fabric of the 
city; instead, it was forgotten.
The MOVE bombing is an enormous black spot in the 
history of Philadelphia, and yet its occurrence is rarely, if 
ever, mentioned. That the bombing held no lasting impact 
in the psyche of Philadelphia is an affront to the deaths of 
those eleven MOVE members. Despite two grand juries 
on the bombing, no one from the city administration ever 
faced any consequences resulting from their part in burning 
down sixty-one houses and killing eleven people, five of 
them children. The city administration did their best to 
rehabilitate their image and move past the bombing without 
suffering any consequences, aside from a lawsuit paid to 
the surviving MOVE members. Reports of the MOVE 
bombing began as highly critical but over time became 
supportive, enabling the administration to shift the blame 
for the bomb and subsequent fire onto MOVE, eventually 
leading to the reelection of Wilson Goode and allowing 
the MOVE bombing to become largely forgotten. That the 
MOVE bombing left no major lasting effect on the city of 
Philadelphia is a disgrace and a disservice to those whose 
homes burned in the blaze and those who perished as a result 
of the city’s actions. 
     26 The homeowners on Osage Avenue had their homes rebuilt, but now most 
are abandoned due to shoddy reconstruction.
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Beginning in the 18th century, the question of what makes a nation has occupied a prominent place in German 
politics. From the national theories of the 18th-century German Romantics, who identified cultural and ethnic 
factors as being the key determinants, to modern civic nationalists and postnationalists, who point to liberal civic 
values and institutions, the importance of collective identity and how it is oriented has remained an important 
topic for German scholars and policymakers. Using survey research, I assess the accuracy and relevance of these 
theories in contemporary German society. I find that, contrary to the optimism of modern thinkers, German 
collective identity remains aligned with the national theories of the Romantics, resulting in ethnic discrimination 
and heightened fears over the loss of culture through external ideological and ethnic sources.
Collective Identity in Germany
An Assessment of National Theories
Sean Starkweather
“Köln stellt sich quer - Tanz die AfD” by Elke Witzig is licensed under CC BY-SA-4.0 
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The potent force of nationalism has deep roots in German 
history. From the first conceptualizations of a singular 
nation by the German Romantics to unification and the 
1871 constitution to the post-reunification era, the manner 
in which Germans have perceived themselves as a nation 
has played a vital role in both domestic and international 
politics. But while nationalism in the eras of Johann Gottfried 
Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Otto von Bismarck, and 
Adolf Hitler are generally well understood, the character of 
contemporary German nationalism remains a topic of much 
debate. While there have always been fringe nationalist 
parties like the National Democratic Party (NDP), they 
remained just that: parties on the fringes of public thought. 
Indeed, the NDP has never succeeded in passing the voting 
threshold of 5% needed to enter the Bundestag parliament 
in federal elections (“September 24,” 2017). However, 
a surge in nationalist sentiments since 2013 threatens the 
multicultural society Germany has nurtured for 75 years.
This surge has been most associated with the rapid rise of 
the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party following the 
European debt crisis that began in late 2009. During the 
eurozone crisis, five European Union member states—Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, and most notably, Greece—
experienced extremely high budget deficits and public debt, 
triggering a sovereign debt crisis that threatened financial 
institutions and the economic stability of the eurozone in 
its entirety, including Germany (“The Eurozone in Crisis,” 
2015). The AfD received just under 5% of the vote in the 
2013 federal elections, which led many to speculate that 
the party would implode soon after its conception (“Will 
Germany’s,” 2013). Yet, despite initial failure, the AfD 
shocked both policymakers and opponents in the 2017 
federal elections by receiving almost 12.6% of the vote to 
become one of the largest parties in Germany (Clarke, 2017).
This new phase in German politics begs the following 
questions: does the AfD’s rise to prominence reflect a 
deeper trend in how Germans perceive themselves as a 
national community? Or is the AfD’s recent electoral 
success simply a notable but ultimately temporary setback 
to regionalist and internationalist ends? After all, 12.6% of 
the vote is still not close at all to the combined 53.4% that 
the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and 
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) received, and 
is nowhere near a majority (Clarke, 2017). These questions 
have become especially pertinent in the wake of the February 
19, 2020, terrorist attack in Hanau, Germany. The attack 
was carried out by a right-wing extremist whose xenophobia 
led him to target two shisha bars that the Turkish community 
frequented before killing his mother and himself (Kaschel, 
2020). The shootings that saw the tragic deaths of ten 
people—nine had an immigrant background, and the tenth 
was the perpetrator’s mother—have brought these questions 
regarding German collective identity to the forefront of 
public discourse (Kaschel, 2020).
A surge in nationalist sentiments 
since 2013 threatens the 
multicultural society Germany 
has nurtured for 75 years.
In recent scholarship, Allen (2010) argued that Germans 
have shifted away from an ethnocentric view of national 
identity towards a cultural and civic one, and Bassey 
(2012) expanded on that argument in noting the formative 
role that the German state has played in constructing this 
more cultural and civic conception of the nation. More 
famously, both Dolf Sternberger and Jürgen Habermas 
have presented theories of constitutional patriotism, which 
grounds collective identity in the shared norms, values, 
and procedures constructed through a liberal-democratic 
constitution. They have rejected the relevance of a national 
identity, arguing that it will be or has been replaced by a 
postnational one following World War II. Their optimism 
towards a shift in collective German identity has been shared 
by previous administrations and, hesitantly, by the current 
government headed by Chancellor Angela Merkel.
In contrast to these perceptions, Connor (1994) asserted 
that traditional German nationalism will inevitably show 
increasing signs of recovery and that the “obituaries for 
ethnonationalism have proved immature” (p. 181). To clarify, 
Connor did not believe that German ethnonationalism 
would be akin to the racially driven chauvinism that defined 
the Nazi epoch, but acknowledged parallels. Other scholars 
have gone further, suggesting that German nationalism 
has adopted a more ethnocentric form that has become 
increasingly prominent; the Brookings Institution even 
published a policy brief on the new threat posed by the AfD’s 
apparent ethnonationalism (Stelzenmüller, 2019).
These approaches cannot adequately account for the 
resurgence of nationalism in Germany. In this paper, 
I examine arguments that the form of nationalism in 
contemporary Germany is of a strictly cultural, civic, or 
ethnic nature, and I work to understand the state’s role in 
inducing such beliefs. I begin by describing the philosophical 
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frameworks of the Romantics and modern theorists. Later, 
I present my argument that German neo-nationalism has 
taken on an ethnocultural form that harkens back to the 
German Romantics and the theories relating to postnational 
identities are mistaken. To support these claims, I utilize 
quantitative and qualitative sources, including voting 
statistics, opinion polls, statements and speeches by various 
government officials, and insights provided by scholars. These 
approaches position me to assess the nature of Germany’s 
neo-nationalism and the validity of its narrower conceptions.
A History of 
German Nationalism
Theoretical Roots
The study of nationalism can very well be nebulous, so 
defining a “nation” at its base is important in approaching 
the question of German nationalism with some clarity. 
Plano and Olton (1969) defined a nation as “a social group 
which shares a common ideology, common institutions and 
customs, and a sense of homogeneity. . . . [T]here is also 
present a strong group sense of belonging associated with 
a particular territory considered to be peculiarly its own” 
(as cited in Connor, 1994, p. 92). In his seminal Imagined 
Communities, Anderson (1983) helped shape how scholars 
frame questions on nationalism by offering a good starting 
point. He defined the nation as “an imagined political 
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign” (p. 6). This imagined community is limited on 
the basis that “even the largest of them . . . has finite, if 
elastic, boundaries” and sovereign because “nations dream of 
being free. . . . [T]he gage and emblem of this freedom is the 
sovereign state” (p. 7). With these insights, we can synthesize 
a definition: a nation is a porous, perceived community 
whose members believe they share a sense of commonness 
intimately tied to a certain territory. Whether this perception 
accurately describes contemporary nationalism and the birth 
of the new international order will be assessed. 
Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte were 
among the first to create theories of German nationalism. 
Herder’s transfiguration of the concept of a Volk [people] in 
his 1784 Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit 
[Ideas for the Philosophy of Human History] was compelling 
and acted as a “radiation-point” around which the “new 
gospel of nationalism” revolved (Hayes, 1927, p. 722). For 
Herder, the Volk derived not through race or ethnicity, but 
through the culture that one inherits as a result of being 
within a particular environment (Hayes, 1927). His idea of 
an environment can be broken down to three fundamental 
factors: physical geography, historical development, and 
folk-character. Although Herder failed to provide a precise 
definition of folk-character, it can best be described as the 
overarching, generalized personality of a particular national 
group. He argued that the natural state of humanity entails 
that a single nation should maintain a single national culture 
and, as Charles Taylor (1994) pointed out, that “a Volk 
should be true to itself ” (p. 31). In other words, a nation 
ought to preserve the integrity of its culture.
With regards to the ideal of authenticity, Herder asserted 
that the Church, in advocating for the continued use of 
specialized Latin, inhibited forms of expression through 
local vernaculars. This, in turn, inhibited the nation from 
realizing its true self (Schmidt, 1957). On a side note, the 
popularity of Herder’s thought lends merit to Anderson’s 
suggestion that the specialization of Latin played a role in 
bringing about national consciousnesses that diametrically 
opposed encompassing religious communities.
Although Fichte defined the 
nation in terms of language and 
general culture at a superficial 
level, his theory ultimately 
rested on ethnicity.
While Herder stated explicitly that he spoke of culture in a 
broad sense, there is some disagreement regarding Fichte’s 
arguments as to what made the nation. It is commonly 
believed that Fichte’s 1808 Reden an die deutsche Nation 
[Addresses to the German Nation] merely narrowed the scope 
of Herder’s theory in that Fichte saw the purity of the native 
language, a cultural artifact, determined a national identity 
(Martyn, 1997). Although Fichte defined the nation in 
terms of language and general culture at a superficial level, 
his theory ultimately rested on ethnicity. His appeals to 
Abstammung and Abkunft [descent and origin] occupied a 
prominent place in his thought, especially in his Reden. And 
though he officially rejected shared language as the principal 
component of a national identity, Fichte’s consistent references 
to descent and origin betrayed his explicit denunciations 
of shared blood (Abizadeh, 2005). Indeed, according to 
Abizadeh (2005), Fichte’s call for die ursprüngliche Sprache 
des Stammvolkes [the original language of one’s ancestral 
people] when speaking on the expressive freedom of a nation 
was inseparable from genealogical purity. As Abizadeh noted, 
“Language must indeed coincide with descent” (p. 354). The 
twin ideas of a history and ancestry common to all Germans 
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are therefore components of Fichte’s theory of nationalism, 
regardless of whether he acknowledged it or even desired it. 
Language only constituted a component of the theory, not 
its entirety. Although Fichte did not offer an ethnonational 
historiography for the German people, the idea of an 
ancestral bond between all Germans was compelling, and 
his work would be invoked by future German nationalists, 
particularly the traditional conservatives and the Nazis 
during the Weimar Republic. Hence, many historians have 
attributed the fervor with which the Nazis pursued their 
ambitions to theorists like Fichte (e.g., Kaufmann, 1942). 
The German Romantics’ concept of the nation rested on an 
ethnocultural foundation. Though Herder’s approach rested 
on a broad culture, Fichte provided a more precise argument 
as to what gave life to the nation and what differentiates 
it from other nations by emphasizing people’s ancestral 
history. However, whether the Romantics were accurate in 
describing the essence of nations can only be determined 
when contrasted with modern conceptions.
Modern Theories of Nationalism
While ethnocultural theories of nationalism found favor 
among academic circles prior to the conclusion of World War 
II, the end of the war in 1945 and the beginning of the Cold 
War brought forth a number of theories positing that nations 
are defined in civic terms. To modern theorists, nations derive 
from the idea that “political attachment ought to centre on 
the norms, the values and, more indirectly, the procedures 
of a liberal democratic constitution” rather than less tangible 
notions of culture, ethnicity, and language (Müller & 
Scheppele, 2008, p. 67). The division of the German state 
into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on the west and 
the German Democratic Republic on the east spawned two 
distinct theories of constitutional patriotism: the “protective” 
patriotism of Dolf Sternberger, which emphasized the 
physical structure of a nation, and the “purifying” patriotism 
of Jürgen Habermas, which emphasized its ethical structure 
(Müller, 2006). These theories stemmed from a series of 
lectures given by Karl Jaspers in 1946 wherein he argued that 
German solidarity could be found only in reflecting on their 
involvement in World War II and the Holocaust.
It was from the insights offered by Jaspers that Sternberger 
constructed his theory of Verfassungspatriotismus [constitut-
ional patriotism] (Bagchi, 2016). Sternberger argued that 
collective identity should derive from the institutions of the 
democratic state and the general concept of the rule of law. 
As Müller (2006) pointed out, this argument depended on a 
“‘militant democracy’ capable of defending itself against its 
internal and external enemies” (p. 284). Having witnessed 
the Weimar Republic’s collapse and the fragmentation of 
German society into rigidly defined factions, he saw this 
political attachment to the state as necessary for social 
cohesion and stability (Müller, 2006). The idea that there are 
enemies that the state must be defended against suggests that 
he was not idealistic enough so as to embrace cosmopolitan 
notions of identity. Rather, Sternberger’s theory danced 
between the ethnocentric chauvinism of nationalism 
on the one hand and the idealistic internationalism of 
cosmopolitanism (Kobyliński, 2017). He saw the primary 
role of politics as the eternal push towards peace and his 
constitutional patriotism as the vehicle by which it could be 
achieved in a democratic state. To emphasize the plausibility 
of his theory, he offered an interpretation of history positing 
that traditional European states had been characterized by the 
presence of constitutional patriotism, particularly Germany 
under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck.
For Sternberger, the Holocaust 
brought about the collective 
emotional conditions that 
would push society towards 
constitutional patriotism.
Sternberger employed arguments that made use of the 
Jaspersian concept of “metaphysical guilt,” which referred 
to the fracturing of solidarity that Jaspers saw across human 
beings and the collective responsibility Germans felt after 
the Holocaust (Müller, 2006, p. 280). For Sternberger, the 
Holocaust brought about the collective emotional conditions 
that would push society towards constitutional patriotism. 
Considering the historical precedent and the situation of 
German society, the shift back to constitutional patriotism 
following the divergent path that the state took in the 1930s 
and 1940s was, in Sternberger’s eyes, likely and perhaps 
inevitable after 1945 (Kobyliński, 2017, p. 47).
Jürgen Habermas’s theory of constitutional patriotism was 
inspired by but diverged from Sternberger’s at a fundamental 
level. Unsurprisingly, Habermas’s theory reflected the new 
optimism that had swept Europe’s intelligentsia in the late 
stages of the Cold War: instead of grounding collective 
identity with the state and the physical institutions 
associated with it, Habermas pinned his theory on the 
liberal political principles and values embedded within a 
constitution (Kobyliński, 2017). He believed that a return to 
the pre-national patriotism espoused by Sternberger was not 
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even possible given recent history. Rather, using Lawrence 
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, he conceived that 
individuals would develop “post-conventional identities” in 
which they would construct reasoned moral philosophies 
and abide by them honestly (Müller, 2006). It is here that 
Habermas’s theory maintains a rationalist line of thought: 
the restructuring of the traditional German state to adhere 
to the Rechtsstaat [rule of law] and the Sozialstaat [welfare 
state] would enable people to engage in the public sphere so 
they can reason with one another as free individuals (Müller, 
2006). The rule of law would push a substantive view of what 
constituted universal norms and protect democratic processes, 
and the welfare state would provide the material conditions 
necessary for individuals to engage in such democratic 
processes as equals. Habermas then focused on the question 
of German guilt, and it is in the controversy surrounding 
how best to handle this guilt that the question of the nature 
of German nationalism takes root; this controversy came to 
be known as the Historikerstreit [historian’s dispute].
For Habermas, the Holocaust 
was a lesson for humanity as a 
whole, and German guilt could 
lead to an identity based on a 
common sense of humanity.  
In contrast to more conservative thinkers, Habermas 
regarded arguments that the only way to establish a stronger 
collective German identity was to embrace a “moderate or 
accepting view of the Holocaust” as simply old-nationalistic 
(Menent, 2018). For Habermas, the Holocaust was a lesson 
for humanity as a whole, and German guilt could lead to 
an identity based on a common sense of humanity that 
transcended the forms of identity seen earlier in the century. 
Thus, the German nation would hardly be a nation at all, but 
rather a social group of people unified by shared liberal values 
and a public sphere where they could engage in politics. The 
factors once believed to help establish a nation—like common 
language, history, and ancestry—were thus nonfactors in 
Habermas’s view, at least in the post-war era. To him, the 
diminishing importance of traditional national identities 
would lend itself to European integration, for there would 
be a particular good common to different communities in 
the form of a shared legal system (Menent, 2018). 
Though Habermas’s later attempts to extend his theory to 
all of Europe and incorporate the possibility of a European 
identity has faced much more criticism among scholars, it 
continues to find support in the post-war era and has been 
adopted by a number of eager, idealistic European politicians 
committed to the idea of a regional community bound 
together by liberal democratic values.
To recapitulate, the 20th century has seen the emergence of 
theories of constitutional patriotism that reject conventional, 
traditional conceptions of national identity associated with 
the German Romantics and Nazi ethnonationalists. Instead, 
these modern theories of collective identities are grounded in 
either concrete ideas pertaining to the state or abstract ones 
pertaining to liberal democratic values. These theories gained 
traction in the late 20th century, and while many have since 
been disillusioned, they remain prominent as a consequence 
of recent German policy and the perceived potential in the 
EU’s ability to nurture a transcendent European identity. In 
2016, Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas even stated that 
“[Germany] has a murky past, but our parents’ generation 
has created a modern Germany: cosmopolitan and liberal 
domestically, good neighbors and peaceful partners abroad” 
(Brady, 2016). It is apparent that a civic postnational view 
remains influential, at least within the state. For these 
modern theories to be determinedly accurate, there must be 
evidence demonstrating that German guilt has maintained 
its resilience as a social phenomenon and cultural or ethnic 
differences are marginal factors that have little to no effect in 
interactions between individuals.
Although the idea that the end of history had been reached 
is not nearly as promising as it once had been, and political 
theorists like Habermas and government officials concede 
that there remain a number of challenges that regional 
institutions like the EU must face, they are firm in their 
belief that the advent of postnational societies or civic-based 
nations is imminent. Many western European countries have 
pursued a form of regionalism wherein national identities are 
superseded by a broader European identity, but no country 
has pursued this ideal with more fervor than Germany. From 
the outset, the new FRG under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
has adopted a foreign policy of Westbindung [binding of 
the West], sowing the seeds for a long-term project of 
incorporating the people into a greater European collective. 
Currently, many believe that this project has begun seeing 
success or at least managed to nurture a national identity 
predicated on civic elements. This is seen most clearly in a 
statement by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Germany’s longest-
serving foreign minister: “the more European our foreign 
policy is, the more national it is” (as cited in Kirchick, 2018). 
While I disagree with Genscher’s assessment, the arguments 
presented in its defense speak to the complexity of the 
questions being addressed.
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Questioning German Guilt
Modern theorists have pointed to German guilt as the cat-
alyst for a new constitutional patriotism that would replace 
the traditional form of nationalism. This position is reason-
able considering that Germany experienced a period of near-
ly complete suppression of nationalist sentiments by both 
the government and the general public in the years immedi-
ately following World War II (Berlin, 2003). The tragedies 
brought about by Hitler’s regime—a regime many supported 
or were sympathetic to—diminished all traces of national-
ism in German society (Breuilly, 1992). However, the initial 
absence of national sentiments may not preclude a later rise 
of nationalism and nationalistic behavior. If this is the case, 
does German guilt ensure that nationalism will permanently 
remain at the fringes of political life? 
Allen (2010) pointed to the failure of the “New Right” in 
procuring significant support among the general population 
as one indication of the German people’s shift away from 
an ethnocentric view of the Volk. While believing in overtly 
positive responses to these questions may have been reason-
able, Connor (1994) provides an argument that tempers the 
implications of Allen’s (2010) claim:
Germans [had] held their ethnonational proclivities 
in tight rein. But as memories recede, as the reali-
zation grows that Nazism and German nationalism 
are not inevitably synonymous, as pride of postwar 
material and cultural achievements takes on the hue 
of pride in German achievements, as older Germans 
come to believe that Germany’s period of atonement 
and parole has lasted long enough, and as a postwar 
generation that believes it cannot be held in any way 
culpable for the mistakes of its parents comes into 
power, German nationalism manifests commensu-
rate signs of recovery. (p. 181)
Because the initial disappearance of German nationalism was 
the product of German guilt, there is a finitude that char-
acterizes the suppression of nationalism. Specifically, the 
temporal aspect of this suppression, which has involved the 
voluntary participation of the people under the state, is such 
that time nullifies the effects of German guilt. Thus, when 
Alexander Gauland, then an AfD candidate for the Bund-
estag, stated that Germans “have the right to be proud of 
the achievements of the German soldiers in two world wars” 
and when AfD’s chief in Thuringia Björn Höcke declared the 
Holocaust memorial in Berlin a “monument of shame” and 
called for a “180-degree turnaround” with regards to German 
guilt, the responses were not a unified outcry against such 
sentiments being clearly nationalistic, but a mixed batter of 
utter outrage, sympathy, and agreement (as cited in Dearden 
2017; as cited in Huggler, 2017). Höcke later clarified that 
the Holocaust “is part of our history. But it is only part of our 
history” and that “guilt consciousness alone cannot create a 
healthy identity, but only a broken one” (as cited in “Fury 
as AfD,” 2017). Yet even his clarification directs attention 
to the problem of German national identity as it relates to 
the feelings of guilt, and more importantly, it hints towards 
the temporal aspect of guilt. As time passes, events fade into 
the backdrop of history, and the tragedies once believed to 
be embedded within the German character become dulled 
within the memories of the German people. 
While the New Right may have 
been at the fringe earlier, it is 
presently a powerful force to be 
reckoned with.
Consequently, the state’s attempts at forcing public con-
scious reflection have been met with increasing confusion 
and resentment. A divide exists between the state’s per-
ception of how the German nation ought to be defined 
and the perception held by many of its people. Although 
Allen (2010) was correct in asserting that Germans have 
shifted away from a strictly ethnocentric understanding 
of the nation, his implicit conclusion that shared his-
tory plays no role does not account for the time factor, 
which cannot be ignored considering the emotive nature 
of guilt. The rapid rise in popularity of the AfD lends 
merit to this idea, for the relative weakness of right-wing 
parties in the early 21st century has, over the course of a 
decade, shifted into relative strength. The AfD is seen as 
an ever-increasing threat by the left-wing and moderate 
parties, especially after the 2017 federal election. While 
the New Right may have been at the fringe earlier, it is 
presently a powerful force to be reckoned with.
A Popular Nationalism
What are the reasons for the feelings of disenfranchisement 
and concern that led to the rise of popular nationalist parties 
like the AfD? To what extent do they speak to the nature of 
Germans’ view of the Volk? Some scholars point to economic 
factors, such as low income and unemployment, as being 
responsible for increases in nationalist sentiments (Hill, 
2017; Staudenmeier, 2017). Unfortunately, these factors do 
not adequately explain the increase in support for the AfD 
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and certainly not the revival of nationalism. To determine 
the underlying factors, it is necessary to analyze public 
opinion in a broader sense, and polling and survey data offer 
good windows of opportunity for determining the content of 
German collective identity. In analyzing this data, notions of 
a German nation predicated on civic values and institutions 
begin to fall apart, and the reality of an ethnocultural 
conception of the nation becomes more evident.
Surveying “Germanness”
Language and religion are typically seen as the cornerstones 
of German culture, although the arts occupy a clear place as 
well. It may be pointed out that Catholic-Protestant divisions 
contradict the notion that religious affiliation is a primary 
binding factor; however, this superficial divide is superseded 
by a general sense of shared faith in Christianity in the face 
of the perceived threat of Islam. One of the most significant 
concerns held by Germans is the “loss of culture, values, and 
the way of life we grew up with”: in 2017, 19% believed that 
it was the greatest threat to the future of their children, and 
95% of those who voted for the AfD believed that Germany 
would experience a real loss of culture (Center for Insights in 
Survey Research, 2017; “Umfragen zur AfD,” 2017). 
The issues that Germans value 
reveal how the AfD grew its 
voter base so rapidly in 
just four years.
This perceived danger can, to an extent, be seen as stemming 
from the influx of Muslim refugees since 2015. Notably, 16% 
of respondents in a Center for Insights in Survey Research 
(2017) poll saw the refugee crisis as the biggest problem facing 
Germany and 20% believed it was the biggest issue facing 
Europe as a whole. Another survey found that 71% of all 
respondents were in favor of limiting the number of refugees 
in the long run, and 79% felt more needed to be done to 
integrate refugees (“Umfragen zur Flüchtlingspolitik,” 2017). 
It should be noted that 54% of respondents believed that 
the refugees were an enrichment for the country (“Umfragen 
zur Flüchtlingspolitik,” 2017). Still, 57% of all survey 
respondents and 92% of Afd supporters were worried that 
the influence of Islam was too strong (“Umfragen zur AfD,” 
2017; “Umfragen zur Flüchtlingspolitik,” 2017). Perhaps 
due in part to this perception, 52% of Germans either 
entertained the idea or were in favor of a “dominant culture” 
(“Over 50% of Germans,” 2017). Given that a significant 
portion of those who voted for a left-wing or center party 
in the 2013 elections switched affiliations and voted for 
the AfD in 2017—of the nearly 6 million votes that the 
AfD received in 2017, over 1 million of those votes came 
from those who voted for the CDU in 2013—the issues 
that Germans value reveal how the AfD grew its voter base 
so rapidly in just four years (Burn-Murdoch et al., 2017). 
Considering that the AfD desires cultural preservation and 
calls for the government to actively protect German culture 
as the “predominant culture” in its “Manifesto for Germany,” 
it is reasonable to presume that those concerned with the loss 
of German culture may feel the pull-factor of the AfD and 
the push-factor of what they perceive as the negligence of 
the parties they voted for in earlier elections (Alternative für 
Deutschland, 2017; Center for Insights in Survey Research, 
2017; Holscher et al., 2017).
The array of survey data suggests that the sentiments and 
policy prescriptions typically attributed to the AfD and other 
far right-wing groups are much more prevalent than believed. 
Cultural artifacts remain vital components of German 
collective identity. Germany’s neo-nationalism, therefore, 
cannot be condemned out of hand as simply a radical 
ideology maintained by fringe movements. Rather, it must 
be recognized as a genuine reaction to a perceived sudden 
shift in the normative social dynamics that characterize 
German life. 
It is important to note that Germans seem not in favor 
of rejecting or deporting all incoming refugees, but of 
expediting the process of deporting asylum seekers who have 
already been rejected. Additionally, Germans are willing to 
accommodate refugees insofar as the refugees are willing to 
integrate into society. This willingness is marked by a general 
acceptance of institutional methods for integrating and 
potentially assimilating refugees among other immigrants. 
In a recent survey, 76% of Germans without a migrant 
background agreed that immigrants ought to “adapt their 
behavior to German culture,” and 83% with a migrant 
background responded the same way (Chase, 2016). Though 
the disparity is not too great, it suggests, as Federal Minister 
Peter Altmaier stated, that the desire to assimilate on the part 
of immigrants in a broad sense is “abundantly and distinctly 
present” (as cited in Chase, 2016). Even though this data 
demonstrably undermines the postnationalist vision, it also 
shows the cultural aspects that underlie “Germanness.”
Immigration
While the proposition that German neo-nationalism has as-
sumed the ethnocultural trappings of Herder and Fichte as 
it did in the late 18th and early 19th centuries can be argued 
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simply on grounds of general public opinion, it is in study-
ing the real dynamics between ethnic Germans and those 
with migrant backgrounds on a more intimate level that the 
nature of neo-nationalism in Germany becomes more appar-
ent. Both steady flows and sudden influxes of immigrants 
are nothing new to Germany. As Bade (1995) observed, 
“since the late nineteenth century, transatlantic emigration 
from Germany has decreased while continental labor immi-
gration has increased” (p. 515). More relevantly, Goodman 
(2007) asserts that “the postwar story of German economic 
and social change has been very much informed, possibly 
dominated, by de facto immigration” (p. 100). Indeed, the 
Wirtschaftswunder [economic miracle] of the 1950s led to la-
bor shortages that required the FRG to pursue policies that 
encouraged immigration of Turkish Gastarbeiter [guest work-
ers]. But there is a major difference between immigration into 
Germany in the late 19th century and in the postwar era: in 
the former period, the government reacted in a hostile man-
ner to the influx of early immigrants, especially in Prussia 
(Bade, 1995). It was during this time that Germany was led 
from ethnocultural to ethnonational conceptions of the na-
tion as the government of the late 19th century “bound civil 
rights to the principle of ethnic descent,” thereby reaffirming 
jus sanguinis [the principle of ethnic heritage] (Bade, 1995, 
p. 522). By extension, the emphasis on ethnic background in 
relation to questions of citizenship laid the groundwork for 
the ethnic nationalist fervor that took Germany by storm in 
the 1930s through the outspoken rhetoric of politicians like 
Heinrich von Treitschke and, of course, Hitler. 
In contrast, immigration in the postwar era was encouraged 
by the FRG, even after reunification in 1990. Yet, despite the 
state’s genuine and commendable attempts to bring about a 
new age of multiculturalism and define the German nation in 
terms of civic values and democratic institutions, the public 
has nonetheless been much more reserved. The case of the 
Turkish population provides a rich instance in this regard.
Integration
The FRG does not track race in its census. However, 
independent analyses have been conducted that involve a 
number of different variables, like intermarriage, naming 
habits, and name-based discrimination. The rate of ethnic 
intermarriage is a powerful indicator of a minority’s 
assimilation into their new society; it is certainly one of the 
most easily observable signs of assimilation as well (Gerhards 
& Hans, 2009). It reflects the amount of interaction between 
members of different ethnic groups and their willingness to 
accept and accommodate one another (Janßen & Schroedter, 
2007). According to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), 
the intermarriage rate among first-generation Turkish men 
in 2008 was 7.1% and 12.1% for second-generation Turkish 
men; first-generation Turkish women had an intermarriage 
rate of 2.6% (Nottmeyer, 2009). The MPI even asserted 
that the increase in intermarriage between first- and 
second-generation Turks in Germany indicated “the second 
generation’s greater commitment to and integration into 
German society” (Nottmeyer, 2009). Intermarriage rates 
between Turks and Germans have, in fact, risen since 2008. 
As of 2017, the rate among Turkish women was 14% while 
the rate among Turkish men was 19% (“Love in Germany,” 
2018). This increase in intermarriages suggests not only 
a willingness among the Turkish population in Germany 
to integrate, but that there are increasingly more ethnic 
Germans willing to accept and accommodate Turks into 
German society. This seems to vindicate, to a small degree, 
the cosmopolitan claim that Europeans are moving beyond 
traditional nationalisms. 
Some have wrongly used 
these findings to push an anti-
immigrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric. 
It must also be considered that the ethnic component of 
collective identity can potentially detract with regards to 
Turkish integration. A 2018 study by the Center for Turkish 
Studies at the University of Duisburg-Essen found that 89% 
of Turks feel they belong either “strongly” or “very strongly” 
in Turkey, greater than the 81% that answered in the same 
manner regarding Germany (Sauer, 2018). This dual identity 
leads to Ross’s (2009) assertion that “the strong ethnic ties and 
identification with the homeland that characterize German-
Turks provide meaning and comfort in daily life, but appear 
to impede assimilation” (p. 710). Some have wrongly used 
these findings to push an anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim 
rhetoric. Kern (2016), for example, emphasized that ethnic 
Turks are, on average, “economically and educationally less 
successful than other immigrant groups.” Taken alone, this 
statement appears to be simply factual. However, when 
grouped with survey data that highlight only the negative 
elements of the Turkish population in Germany, the result is 
a view slanted to enhance a preconceived political ideology, 
which neglects the real progress made by German Turks 
towards assimilating and integrating. Although it may appear 
ethnic Turks are “resisting” assimilation and less inclined 
to assimilate compared to other minorities, the Turkish 
population’s relative acculturation is roughly equal to other 
immigrant populations that originate from countries that are 
culturally closer (Gerhards & Hans, 2009). In simpler terms, 
as Pokorny (2017) noted,
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Hans (2010) shows that the majority of immigrants 
do in fact assimilate into German society. The first 
generation generally does not assimilate complete-
ly, but some members of the second generation be-
come totally assimilated. When it comes to the con-
sumption of high culture, Hans (2015) notes that 
third-generation immigrants are no different from 
young Germans. (p. 11)
Despite this reality, many Germans have tended to distinguish 
themselves from German-Turks, as evidenced by the famous 
departure of Mesut Özil from the German national football 
team; Özil was quoted as saying, “I am German when we win, 
but I am an immigrant when we lose” (as cited in “German 
Turks still rooted,” 2018). Inter-ethnocultural relations may 
have improved, but there is clearly much progress to be made.
Hyphenation
Although there are a number of modes by which to 
demonstrate ethnic socialization between ethnic Turks and 
Germans, ethnic acculturation is most simply demonstrated 
via naming habits. Gerhards and Hans (2009) found that 
while Turks were less likely to give their children German 
names, having close interethnic relationships of any kind 
with ethnic Germans greatly increased the likelihood that 
a Turk would opt for a German name for their child, and 
“a high share of Turks married to German partners adopt 
naming habits completely in line with ethnic Germans.” 
Moreover, given that names are associated with particular 
ethnic groups, this also reinforces the idea that there is in 
fact a strong ethnic component to collective identities and 
how they are developed.
The existence of name-based discrimination is a powerful 
indicator of the importance of ethnicity as it relates to identity. 
Names have long been an identifier of ethnic background. 
In Bosnia, for example, last names specifically were used to 
identify friend and foe as the new country collapsed into 
civil conflict in the early- to mid-90s (Nye & Welch, 2017). 
While name-based exclusionary behavior in Germany is not 
nearly as dramatic as in Bosnia, there is  strong evidence that 
ethnic discrimination against individuals with identifiably 
Turkish names still exists in German society, particularly 
in schools and the workplace. In schools, Bonefeld and 
Dickhäuser (2018) found that “when a student was assumed 
to have a migrant background [through names], the dictation 
was graded less favorably compared to a student without 
a migrant background, namely by 0.3 grade steps” (p. 7). 
Bonefeld and Dickhäuser (2018) noted that this disparity is 
more likely a result of a positive bias toward students without 
a migrant background than a negative bias towards students 
with a migrant background. This bias may play a role in 
students with migrant backgrounds attending lower-track 
schools compared to native ethnic Germans. 
The ethnic component of 
collective identities is still 
important in how people 
interact in German society. 
Ethnic discrimination also exists in the workplace. Kaas 
and Manger (2012) found that applications marked by an 
identifiably German name were 14% more likely to receive 
callbacks from larger firms and 24% more likely to receive a 
callback from smaller firms than similar applications marked 
by an identifiably Turkish name. Again, the name-based 
discrimination found in the study was less severe than in other 
countries, like Greece against Albanians, Sweden against 
Arabs, and the United States against African Americans. 
These disparities in how students and applicants are treated 
based on their names indicate that the ethnic component of 
collective identities is still important in how people interact 
in German society (Bonefield & Dickhäuser, 2018).
Conclusion
German neo-nationalism, which has revealed itself gradually 
since 2013, has taken on an ethnocultural form that reflects 
19th century theories on what constitutes a nation according 
to the German Romantics. This is the case despite the 
FRG’s attempts to develop a multicultural society in which 
German identity is grounded in democratic institutions. 
Many politicians, theorists, and laymen alike argue that 
ethnocultural conceptions of the nation are anachronistic 
in the contemporary era and only the radical segments of 
the German population retain such conceptions. By and 
large, however, Germans have exhibited great concern as to 
the preservation of cultural artifacts, like language, arts, and 
religion, which they perceive may be under threat, especially 
following the influx of Muslim refugees in recent years.
Ethnicity remains an important part of Germany’s social 
dynamics, and judgments about the character of an individual 
are still made on the basis of ethnic/migrant background, even 
though the practice is not as prevalent as in other countries. 
It can therefore be said that German collective identity is not 
as firmly grounded in a constitutional patriotism or a form 
of postnationalism as many would like to believe. Instead, 
German collective identity involves strong cultural and 
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Based on Cohen and Felson’s 1979 routine activity theory, this study examines crime rates on prominent U.S. 
holidays. Little research exists that analyzes crime patterns on holidays, despite the mass disruption of routine 
activities. Using data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), this study compares the 
average daily number of offenses per state on 15 holidays with the average daily number of offenses per state on 
non-holiday weekdays for the 2016 calendar year. The crimes under investigation are economically motivated 
crimes: burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and robbery. Holidays are divided into groups for analysis based 
on where activities are generally pursued by the public on each day: private space, public space, and mixed space. 
The results reveal a distinct pattern in crime rates on holidays: economically motivated crimes tend to occur 
less frequently on holidays, regardless of space classification. Despite an increased potential for contact between 
suitable targets and motivated offenders on mixed and public space holidays, an increase in guardianship may be 
a primary cause of lower economic crime rates on holidays. It is also possible that the increase in residence-based 
activities on private and mixed space holidays reduces the number of suitable targets.
Christmas Criminals
A Routine Activity Approach to Crime on U.S. 
Holidays
Wyatt Lam
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Despite limited budgets, law enforcement officials are 
expected to prevent crime, apprehend criminals, maintain 
public order and safety, investigate criminal activity, and 
provide services, such as education to the public. One way 
that police have been able to more effectively utilize their 
resources is by carrying out predictive policing. Predictive 
policing is the practice of analyzing crime data to predict 
and prevent future crimes (Perry et al. 2013). Crime 
analysts use crime reporting databases such as the National 
Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and the National 
Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to illustrate 
crime tendencies. Often, local police departments utilize 
these resources to generate crime patterns for their region, 
including spatial hotspots mapping and temporal trends: 
hourly, weekly, monthly, seasonal, and annual crime rates. 
One promising perspective from criminological theory is 
routine activity theory. Initially developed by Cohen and 
Felson (1979), the theory has received broad support in 
the field of criminology and may be helpful in improving 
predictive policing. The theory states that crime occurs 
when three key elements converge spatially and temporally: 
a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of 
capable guardians. Cohen and Felson (1979) argue that 
deviations from routine activities change the probability of 
the three elements co-occurring. 
Holidays, given their potential widespread disruption of 
daily activities, are a promising cultural arena in which to 
study Cohen and Felson’s theory (1979). For example, 
holidays may cause many workplaces to close for the day, 
which affects the daily activities of both their employees and 
customers/clients. Holidays are especially important because 
they represent a macro-causal factor for routine activity 
changes. However, routine activity theory research has 
tended to focus on small-scale interactions and has left out 
population-scale ones. While there has been some research 
on holiday crime patterns, the findings are scarce and 
need further development. To improve predictive policing 
practices, a thorough understanding of how holidays affect 
crime rates is necessary. 
Literature Review
Routine Activity Theory 
Cohen and Felson (1979) developed routine activity theory as 
an approach to crime analysis focused on the circumstances 
of an offense as opposed to offender characteristics. The 
theory focuses primarily on explaining victimization and 
treats criminals as rational actors who weigh the potential 
risks and benefits of committing crimes. According to 
routine activity theory, crime occurs when three key elements 
converge spatially and temporally: a motivated offender, a 
suitable target, and the absence of capable guardians (Cohen 
and Felson 1979). Motivated offenders include anyone who 
is capable and willing to commit crime. Suitable targets 
include people and objects, such as cars, homes, stores, 
etc. Capable guardians include formal guardians, such as 
police or security personnel, and informal guardians, such 
as bystanders, friends, bartenders, etc. Cohen and Felson 
(1979) argued that the structure of daily activities influences 
opportunities for victimization. Additionally, they suggested 
that deviations from routine activities change the likelihood 
of a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of 
capable guardians coming together in time and space. 
Lynch (1987) provided early evidence in support of the 
theory finding that victims’ workplace activities affect their 
risk of workplace victimization to a much greater extent than 
sociodemographic factors. Lynch (1987) found that activities 
such as handling money and coming into contact with 
numerous others on a given workday increase the likelihood 
of workplace victimization. Groff (2007) performed a 
rigorous multi-model test of routine activity theory in her 
study of street robbery. She found that increased time spent 
away from home increased the probability of victimization, 
providing strong support for the theory. 
Since its inception, routine activity theory has been used 
to test a myriad of criminological phenomena including 
victimization of teachers (O and Wilcox 2017), stalking 
(Mustaine and Tewksbury 1999; Reyns et al. 2016; Wood 
and Stichman 2018), sexual assault (Franklin et al. 2012; 
Franklin and Menaker 2018), and motor vehicle theft 
(Badiora 2017) to name a few. This body of research, 
which examines violent and property crime alike, provides 
mounting evidence that the types of activities pursued 
on a regular basis influence individuals’ likelihood of 
victimization. In recent years, research has also found that 
individuals’ activities can predict the likelihood of cyber-
crime victimization, including consumer fraud (Pratt, 
Holtfreter, and Reisig 2010), cyberbullying (Navarro and 
Jasisnki 2011), and identity theft (Williams 2016; Reyns and 
Henson 2016). 
Holiday Crime Literature
Studies utilizing routine activity theory tend to focus 
on identifying activities that increase the likelihood of 
victimization. This study applies a macro-level analysis to 
the disruption of daily patterned behavior. To identify the 
general disruption of routine activities, this study examines 
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events that tend to affect activities on a widespread basis: 
holidays. Few studies have examined the effect of holidays 
on crime patterns; however, holidays can have a dramatic 
impact on daily activities. The mass interruption of activities 
on holidays such as Christmas Day or New Year’s Eve 
presents an important opportunity to examine how crime 
rates are affected by the disruption of routine activities. 
Early research by Lester (1979) examined homicides in the 
United States in 1973 and found that their incidence tended 
to increase on major holidays and weekends, coinciding with 
increased contact with family, friends, and acquaintances. 
More recently, de Melo, Pereira, Andresen, and Matias (2018) 
studied the occurrence of homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, 
and theft on prominent holidays in Campinas, Brazil, 
between 2010 and 2013. They found homicides significantly 
increased during the day, burglaries significantly increased 
at night, and all other crimes significantly decreased during 
these holidays. The researchers explained these results in 
terms of guardianship; people tend to gather in groups on 
holidays, deterring crime, but empty houses are typically 
easily detected on holiday nights, leading to an increase in 
burglaries. They also suggested that alcohol consumption 
may contribute to the increase in these crimes. 
Cohn and Rotton (2003) examined crime on holidays 
during the years 1985 and 1988 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
They analyzed differences in the following offenses between 
major (federal) and minor holidays: assault, disorderly 
conduct, domestic violence, burglary, theft, and robbery. 
They found that thefts, burglaries, and robberies tended 
to occur less frequently on major holidays while cases of 
assault, disorderly conduct, and domestic violence tended 
to increase on major holidays. In addition, minor holidays 
had no significant effects on crime frequency. The results 
of Cohn and Rotton’s study (2003) suggest that minor 
holidays may not dramatically influence routine activities. 
In addition, the decrease in economically motivated crimes 
is consistent with the findings of de Melo et al. (2018) and 
may reflect heightened guardianship on holidays. 
Hypothesis, Data, and Methods
Offense and Holiday Choices
This study examines economically motivated crimes, which 
are the crimes most often committed as rational decisions, 
rather than impulsive actions. Specifically, this includes 
burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and robbery. Each 
of these crimes involves the intentional theft of another’s 
property. This study utilizes the official Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) definitions for these crimes (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 2010). Burglary is “the unlawful 
entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft.” Larceny 
is “the unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of 
property from the possession or constructive possession of 
another.” Motor vehicle theft is “the theft or attempted theft 
of a motor vehicle.” Robbery is “the taking or attempting 
to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control 
of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence 
and/or by putting the victim in fear.” By examining only 
economically motivated crimes, this study aims to capture 
the crimes for which routine activity theory is most 
applicable.
Fifteen holidays that elicit widespread business closings 
for the day and/or widespread celebration were chosen for 
analysis. These holidays are New Year’s Day, Super Bowl 
Sunday, Martin Luther King Jr. Day, President’s Day, St. 
Patrick’s Day, Easter Sunday, Memorial Day, Independence 
Day, Labor Day, Veteran’s Day, Thanksgiving, Black 
Friday, Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and New Year’s 
Eve. Although they are not recognized as holidays by the 
federal government, Black Friday and Super Bowl Sunday 
are celebrated as unofficial holidays in popular culture.
Holiday Operationalization
Unlike Cohn and Rotton (2003), who organized their 
analysis of holidays around whether the days were major 
or minor holidays, this study organizes holidays based on 
where activities are generally pursued by the public on each 
day. I organize holidays into three categories: private space, 
public space, and mixed space. I chose to categorize holidays 
by space typically occupied because where people gather 
directly influences the number of motivated offenders, 
suitable targets, and guardians. Each category reflects space 
occupation tendencies as compared to the typical workday.
The private space category consists of holidays on which people 
tend to stay inside their homes more often than a typical 
workday. The holidays in the private space category include 
Martin Luther King Jr. Day, President’s Day, Memorial Day, 
Labor Day, Veteran’s Day, and Christmas Day. For most of 
the holidays in this category, work schedules are interrupted 
but few are celebrating. There may be variation in activities
on Memorial Day, on which many people stay indoors as 
compared to a typical workday, but others may participate 
in outdoor activities such as going to parks, having picnics, 
going to lunch, etc. Christmas Day differs from other 
holidays in the private space category because most people 
do celebrate throughout the day; however, they tend to do so 
from the comfort of their own homes or the homes of family. 
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The public space category consists of holidays on which 
people typically celebrate in places outside of where their 
routine activities typically take them. This includes bars, 
clubs, restaurants, and parties. Holidays in the public space 
category include St. Patrick’s Day, Independence Day, and 
New Year’s Eve. Independence Day and New Year’s Eve are 
federal holidays, so schools, businesses, and organizations 
are closed, but people still tend to spend large parts of these 
days in public spaces. Because Independence Day is in the 
summer, many people spend all day outside, especially at 
parks, barbecues and parties. On the night of New Year’s 
Eve, many people attend celebrations, which I predict draw 
a substantial portion of Americans into public spaces for 
considerable lengths of time. Because St. Patrick’s Day fell 
on a weekday in 2016, I infer that activities on this day 
followed routines until the late afternoon when many chose 
to celebrate, often at bars. 
The mixed space category consists of days in which many 
people may be out in public spaces for large parts of the day, 
but others may spend the majority of the day at home or the 
home of family. These are days on which most people do not 
have typical responsibilities like work or school. The holidays 
in the mixed space category are New Year’s Day, Super Bowl 
Sunday, Easter Sunday, Thanksgiving, Black Friday, and 
Christmas Eve. On New Year’s Day, some people choose 
to celebrate away from home, some are recovering from the 
previous night’s celebration, and some spend the day at home 
getting ready for work or school to resume. On Super Bowl 
Sunday, many people stay home to watch the game, while 
others watch the game at bars and celebrate afterwards. 
Easter Sunday traditions may include spending time at 
home with family, attending church, and participating in 
Easter-related activities such as egg hunts in outdoor spaces. 
Similarly, Thanksgiving is often a day spent at home with 
family or traveling. Many people spend Thanksgiving night 
shopping, as many stores offer special deals at or before 
midnight. Black Friday is a day of shopping for many people, 
but the rise in popularity of online retailers has the potential 
to keep many shoppers at home. On Christmas Eve, people 
celebrate at parties, and many go to church, but it is also 
common for people to spend large portions of the day at 
home, typically with family.
Hypothesis
I analyze separate hypotheses for burglary, larceny, motor 
vehicle theft, and robbery to ascertain whether there is 
consistency in holiday crime rates across economically 
motivated crimes. Based on the three holiday categories, and 
the premise that changes in routine activities have an effect 
on how much crime tends to occur, I predict the following 
for economically motivated crimes on holidays: 
H1: Compared to the daily average, the number of reported 
burglaries will be lower on private space holidays and higher 
on public space holidays.
On private space days, I presume that the number of suitable 
targets for burglaries (empty homes) decreases, while the 
amount of guardianship increases because most people are 
gathered at home on these days. I predict that fewer suitable 
targets and increased guardianship results in fewer burglaries 
on private space holidays. 
On public space days, I presume that the number of suitable 
targets increases and the amount of guardianship decreases 
because more people gather in public on these days than 
the average day. I presume that a rational offender would 
anticipate people leaving homes unattended, increasing the 
number of motivated offenders. I predict that the increase 
in suitable targets, decrease in guardianship, and increase 
in motivated offenders results in more burglaries on public 
space holidays. 
H2: Compared to the daily average, the number of reported 
larcenies will be lower on private space holidays and higher 
on public space holidays.
H3: Compared to the daily average, the number of reported 
motor vehicle thefts will be lower on private space holidays 
and higher on public space holidays.
H4: Compared to the daily average, the number of reported 
robberies will be lower on private space holidays and higher 
on public space holidays.
On private space days, I presume that the number of suitable 
targets for larcenies, motor vehicle thefts, and robberies 
decreases because all three crimes rely on contact between 
motivated offenders and targets. I presume that this contact 
occurs less frequently on private space holidays because many 
people tend to stay inside residences for most of the day. I 
presume that the amount of guardianship increases because, 
compared to the daily average, more people are clustered 
together at home on these days. I predict that fewer suitable 
targets and increased guardianship results in fewer larcenies, 
motor vehicle thefts, and robberies on private space holidays. 
On public space days, I presume that the number of suitable 
targets increases because many people are congregating in 
public places where motivated offenders are likely to be found. 
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This increases the potential for contact between motivated 
offenders and suitable targets. I presume that an increased 
consumption of alcohol creates more suitable targets, more 
motivated offenders, and less-capable guardians. Intoxication 
lowers awareness, which may make individuals more suitable 
targets and less-capable guardians, especially if rational 
offenders anticipate such an opportunity. Additionally, 
intoxication lowers inhibitions and reduces judgment, which 
may increase the number of motivated offenders willing to 
commit economically motivated crimes. I predict that the 
increase in suitable targets, increase in motivated offenders, 
and decrease in capable guardians results in more larcenies, 
motor vehicle thefts, and robberies on public space holidays.
 
H5: Compared to the daily average, the number of reported 
burglaries, larcenies, motor vehicle thefts, and robberies will 
not be notably different on mixed space holidays.
On mixed space holidays, I presume that opportunities for 
crime both increase and decrease to a similar degree as a 
result of public and private space activities, respectively. As 
such, I predict no appreciable change in reported offenses. 
National Incident-Based Reporting 
System (NIBRS)
NIBRS is an incident-based crime reporting system, which 
houses data on all instances of crime that law enforcement 
report across the United States. Included in this data set is 
criminal and victim information, such as demographics, and 
crime information, such as when, where, and how the crime 
occurred. 57 different crimes are captured by NIBRS and 
broken down into three categories: crimes against persons (of 
which individuals are victims), crimes against property (of 
which money or property is the object), and crimes against 
society (which are actions prohibited by society, such as drug 
use). Each of the 57 offenses are classified in the NIBRS 
database according to the official FBI definitions (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 2010). 
NIBRS is a part of the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) 
program administered by the FBI. City, county, and state 
officials from 48 states voluntarily collect and report incident-
based crime logs on a monthly basis to state or federal UCR 
programs. Given that the organization of reports from 
different agencies and states may differ, UCR programs must 
merge, restructure, and subset the data into yearly, formally 
structured NIBRS data sets. The data are made public on 
the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD) 
website, which is a part of the Inter-University Consortium 
for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. 
Procedure and Data Analysis
2016 NIBRS data were downloaded from the NACJD 
website into SPSS Statistics software. All incidents of 
crime outside of burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and 
robbery were removed from the data set. Burglary includes 
breaking and entering. Larceny includes pocket-picking, 
purse-snatching, shoplifting, theft from a building, theft 
from a coin-operated machine or device, theft from a motor 
vehicle, theft of motor vehicle parts/accessories, and all other 
larceny. New variables were created to indicate holidays and 
holiday space groupings. While working with multiple years 
of data would be ideal, the computer files for any single year 
are massive and tax the computing power available to the 
average person. Thus, 2016 data were aggregated by state and 
incident date with simple counts of offenses. Weekends were 
omitted from the data set in order to best compare holiday 
crime rates with crime rates of the typical Monday through 
Friday “work-week.” Means comparisons were produced to 
compare the state daily average number of crimes on holidays 
versus non-holiday weekdays. The comparisons were run on 
the total of all four economically motivated crimes, and then 
broken out for each specific crime category. There are five 
sets of analyses for examining individual holidays and five 
sets for examining holiday categories. 
Statistical Significance
Statistical significance is not particularly relevant in this 
study because the NIBRS data set was not acquired through 
a probability sample. The data can be best described as a 
convenience sample, given that many police departments 
choose not to report or are unable to report crime incidents 
to the UCR. As a result, the data set contains only crimes 
that are available to the FBI. Additionally, the data are not 
a sample of available crimes but rather the entirety of those 
crimes. Therefore, significance has been excluded from the 
results.
First of the Month
There is an overrepresentation of crime on the first of each 
month in the NIBRS data set, meaning there are substantially 
more economically motivated crimes recorded on the first of 
the month than any other day. Unfortunately, the cause of 
this is unknown, and I highly suspect it to be a recording 
artifact as opposed to a real criminological phenomenon. 
However, because I do not know the cause for certain, I have 
chosen to keep these days in the data set. Overall, the daily 
averages are not noticeably affected, but New Years Day has 
an unusually high number of reported offenses. 
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Results
All Four Economically Motivated Crimes
Figure 1 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily 
average number of economically motivated crimes in each 
holiday category with the state daily average number of 
economically motivated crimes on non-holiday weekdays. 
On holidays in all three categories, fewer economically 
motivated crimes occurred on average per state than the 
2016 daily weekday average of 181.39. This finding is 
inconsistent with H5, in which I predicted that the number 
of reported burglaries, larcenies, motor vehicle thefts, and 
robberies would not be notably different on mixed space 
holidays compared to the daily average.
Figure 1: State Daily Average Economically Motivated Crimes 
in 2016 by Holiday Category
Figure 2 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily 
average number of economically motivated crimes on each 
individual holiday with the state daily average number of 
economically motivated crimes on non-holiday weekdays. 
On 2 of 15 holidays, more economically motivated crimes 
occurred on average per state than the 2016 daily weekday 
average.  
Figure 2: State Daily Average Number of Economically 
Motivated Crimes in 2016 by Individual Holiday
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Figure 3 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily 
average number of burglaries in each holiday category with 
the state daily average number of burglaries on weekday non-
holidays. On holidays in all three categories, fewer burglaries 
occurred on average per state than the 2016 daily weekday 
average of 36.18. This finding is inconsistent with H1, in 
which I predicted that the number of reported burglaries 
would be lower on private space holidays and higher on 
public space holidays compared to the daily average.
Figure 3: State Daily Average Burglaries in 2016 by Holiday 
Category
Figure 4 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily 
average number of burglaries on each individual holiday with 
the state daily average number of burglaries on non-holiday 
weekdays. On 3 of 15 holidays, more burglaries occurred on 
average per state than the 2016 daily weekday average. 
Figure 4: State Daily Average Burglaries in 2016 by Individual 
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Figure 5 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily 
average number of larcenies in each holiday category with 
the state daily average number of larcenies on weekday non-
holidays. On holidays in all three categories, fewer larcenies 
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occurred on average per state than the 2016 daily weekday 
average of 128.96. This finding is inconsistent with H2, in 
which I predicted that the number of reported larcenies 
would be lower on private space holidays and higher on 
public space holidays compared to the daily average.
Figure 5: State Daily Average Larcenies in 2016 by Holiday 
Category
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Figure 6 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily 
average number of larcenies on each individual holiday with 
the state daily average number of larcenies on non-holiday 
weekdays. On 2 of 15 holidays, more larcenies occurred on 
average per state than the 2016 daily weekday average. 
Figure 6: State Daily Average Larcenies in 2016 by Individual 
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Motor Vehicle Theft
Figure 7 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily 
average number of motor vehicle thefts in each holiday 
category with the state daily average number of motor 
vehicle thefts on non-holiday weekdays. On holidays in 
all three categories, fewer motor vehicle thefts occurred 
on average per state than the 2016 daily weekday average 
of 17.22. This finding is inconsistent with H3, in which 
I predicted that the number of reported motor vehicle 
thefts would be lower on private space holidays and higher 
on public space holidays compared to the daily average.
 
Figure 7: State Daily Average Motor Vehicle Thefts in 2016 by 
Holiday Category
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Figure 8 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily 
average number of motor vehicle thefts on each individual 
holiday with the state daily average number of motor vehicle 
thefts on non-holiday weekdays. On 6 of 15 holidays, more 
motor vehicle thefts occurred on average per state than the 
2016 daily weekday average. 
Figure 8: State Daily Average Motor Vehicle Thefts in 2016 by 
Individual Holiday
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Robbery
Figure 9 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily 
average number of robberies in each holiday category with 
the state daily average number of robberies on non-holiday 
weekdays. On private space holidays and mixed space 
holidays, fewer robberies occurred on average per state than 
the 2016 daily weekday average of 7.29. On public space 
holidays, more robberies occurred on average per state than 
the 2016 daily weekday average. This finding is consistent 
with H4, in which I predicted that the number of reported 
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robberies would be lower on private space holidays and higher 
on public space holidays compared to the daily average.
Figure 9: State Daily Average Robberies in 2016 by Holiday 
Category
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Figure 10 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily 
average number of robberies on each individual holiday with 
the state daily average number of robberies on non-holiday 
weekdays. On 6 of 15 holidays, more robberies occurred on 
average per state than the 2016 daily weekday average.
Figure 10: State Daily Average Robberies in 2016 by Individual 
Holiday
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Discussion and Conclusion
This study analyzes crime rates for burglary, larceny, motor 
vehicle theft, and robbery on prominent U.S. holidays in 
2016 from the perspective of routine activity theory. The 
results reveal a distinct pattern in crime rates on holidays: 
economically motivated crimes tend to occur less frequently 
on holidays, regardless of space classification. 
For holiday groups, the results consistently indicate (14 out 
of 15 times across all five sets of holiday group analyses) that 
economically motivated crimes tend to occur less frequently 
on holidays regardless of category. For individual holidays, 
the pattern is the same: the results consistently indicate 
(56 out of 75 times across all five sets of individual holiday 
analyses) that economically motivated crimes tend to occur 
less frequently on holidays. While robbery and motor vehicle 
theft show the least consistency, each of the holidays with 
crime rates higher than the weekday average show only 
minor elevations over the average. 
The consistently lower rates in economically motivated 
crimes on holidays found in this study mirrors the findings 
of de Melo et al. (2018) and Cohn and Rotton (2003). 
Besides an increase in evening burglaries, de Melo et al. 
(2018) found that fewer economic crimes occurred on 
holidays. Likewise, Cohn and Rotton (2003) found that 
fewer economic crimes occurred on major holidays. In my 
hypotheses, I predicted that this study’s results for private 
space holidays would match these two previous studies, but 
I did not predict that crime rates on public space holidays or 
mixed space holidays would also be lower than the weekday 
average. My hypotheses were based primarily upon the 
motivated offender and suitable target elements of routine 
activity theory. On public space days, I presumed that the 
paths of motivated offenders and suitable targets would 
cross more frequently due to widespread celebration in and 
movement through public spaces, leading to higher crime 
rates. However, this study’s results suggest other factors 
may be associated with the unanticipated lower crime rates 
observed. One explanation is that potential offenders are 
preoccupied with holiday activities and celebration such 
that there are fewer motivated offenders to take advantage of 
suitable targets. Another explanation is proposed by de Melo 
et al. (2018) and Cohn and Rotton (2003): guardianship 
plays a substantial role in deterring crime on holidays.
I presume that on holidays in all three categories, people 
tend to gather together. On private space holidays, people 
are off work and children are out of school, so many people 
tend to gather in private residences for the day. Not only is 
there little contact with motivated offenders, there is also 
family nearby. On public space holidays, people tend to stay 
in groups. People are celebrating together either with family, 
friends, or large groups of strangers (e.g., at bars, clubs, or 
parties). While imbibing alcohol may impact guardianship 
capabilities on these days, guardians may not need to be 
entirely capable of “guarding” to be effective deterrents. 
Simply being with other people may deter potential criminals, 
regardless of the guardians’ sobriety. Additionally, police 
patrol known public events, so truly “capable” guardianship 
is typically present as well. On mixed space holidays, people 
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pursue both private and public holiday activities and are 
subject to the same guardianship tendencies.
Study Drawbacks
There are four primary drawbacks to this research that should 
be discussed. First, only 48 states contribute their crime 
data to NIBRS, and many states have only a few precincts 
reporting. Therefore, the data do not completely represent all 
areas of the country, nor the true average number of crimes 
committed per state. Next, in any given year, a locality, city, 
or the country as a whole may focus resources on particular 
types of crime. Policies at each of these administrative levels 
influence police activity and resource allocation. Therefore, 
official crime statistics like NIBRS may be a better indicator 
of police behavior than actual levels of crime. Third, 
seasonal temperatures may influence the kinds of activities 
individuals pursue when their routine activities are disrupted. 
For example, the activities in which people participate on 
Christmas are different than those on Independence Day. It 
is likely that different sets of non-routine activities result in 
different likelihoods of crime occurring. Lastly, this study 
is only based on one year’s worth of data. Adding more 
years would increase the validity and generalizability of this 
study’s findings. 
Study Implications and Future Research
This study was a worthwhile examination of routine activity 
theory because it shows that the theory can be applied broadly 
to generalizable sets of activities to better understand where 
police resources are best applied. The analysis presented here 
suggests that maintaining police presence on holidays with 
large gatherings of people in public spaces is an important 
deterrent of crime. However, police should be wary not to 
over-distribute resources on holidays given that friends, 
family, and nearby others are effective deterrents as well. 
I have theorized that, despite an increased potential for 
contact between suitable targets and motivated offenders on 
mixed and public space holidays, the increase in guardianship 
may be a primary cause of lower economic crime rates on 
holidays. It is also likely that the increase in private space 
activities on private and mixed space holidays also reduces 
the number of suitable targets. However, the consistency of 
lower crime rates across all holiday groups makes certainty 
about the underlying factors impossible. Future research 
should aim to identify with more confidence the causes 
for reduced economic crime rates on holidays. This study 
could be replicated with more years of NIBRS data so that 
breaking incidents down by state is no longer necessary. 
Additionally, I suggest that future studies examine the nature 
of guardianship on holidays and how criminals navigate 
and are deterred by its presence. I would also recommend 
that weekend routines and crime rates be analyzed and 
compared to those of holidays. Both weekends and holidays 
are a departure from weekday “business-as-usual” routines, 
so one might suppose that weekend crime rates are similar 
to holiday crime rates. Finally, the rates of other crimes, such 
as homicide or rape, could be examined on holidays. The 
results of such an analysis could be vastly different than the 
one presented here, given that acquaintances are more likely 
offenders than strangers for those crimes.
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A smart city is an interconnection of technological components that store, process, and wirelessly transmit 
information to enhance the efficiency of applications and the individuals who use those applications. Over the 
course of the 21st century, it is expected that an overwhelming majority of the world’s population will live in urban 
areas and that the number of wireless devices will increase. The resulting increase in wireless data transmission 
means that the privacy of data will be increasingly at risk. This paper uses a holistic problem-solving approach 
to evaluate the security challenges posed by the technological components that make up a smart city, specifically 
radio frequency identification, wireless sensor networks, and Bluetooth. The holistic focus in turn permits a set of 
technical and ethical approaches that can combat malicious attacks and enhance data security across the networks 
that drive smart cities.
An Analysis of Technological Components 
in Relation to Privacy in a Smart City
Kayla Rutherford, Ben Lands, 
and A. J. Stiles
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1. Introduction 
As cities become increasingly connected through smart 
technologies and as current big data collection practices 
continue to go unchecked, information privacy has the 
potential to diminish. If procedures on data handling and 
security are not standardized early in the implementation of 
cyber-physical systems and Internet of Things (IoT) systems, 
then privacy gaps and invasive data mining will likely arise. 
These threats have the potential to affect the advancement 
of smart cities, as citizens may feel their privacy rights are 
unduly compromised, which in turn may undermine public 
support. In order to protect the right to privacy from invasive 
attacks on vulnerable networks and devices in emerging 
smart cities, solutions that address both social and technical 
aspects of the issue must be devised and analyzed. 
Smart cities are a collection of interconnected technologies 
that can communicate with one another to monitor, collect, 
interpret, and distribute data. These entwined devices 
make up the IoT, a global network of wirelessly-connected 
devices. A smart city is constructed of a network-based 
foundation that contains appliances and infrastructures that 
in turn contain sensors, software, and electrical components. 
The broader purposes of smart cities vary from customer 
convenience to power reduction. The technological foundat- 
ion of smart cities rests on three primary elements: radio 
frequency identification (RFID) for identification and 
tracking, wireless sensor networks (WSN) which are stand-
alone networks for measuring data, and Bluetooth for 
connecting separate devices. 
To understand and develop a solution to a problem, one 
must understand the complexity of its dimensions. This 
is done through holistic problem solving, an approach for 
examining elements, relationships, and the system dynamics 
of a complex problem. According to the Penn State College 
of Agricultural Sciences (n.d.), a complex problem, also 
known as a “wicked” problem, cannot be solved by a 
single solution. The problem with privacy in a smart city is 
complicated because of the value placed on privacy, as well as 
the technological underpinnings within such cities. Multiple 
stakeholders with different levels of interest, connection, and 
power shape the problem. Data security may be presented 
in many alternative methods, so a single solution will be 
insufficient to address the various interests of stakeholders.
The first step of a holistic approach, and the focus of this 
paper, is to determine the problem through framing. Framing 
is describing and interpreting the problem by choosing which 
aspects to prioritize and which to leave in the background. 
Framing lessens the complexity of the problem by narrowing 
the scope to a specific area of interest, and thus allows for a 
more scientific problem statement (Bartee, 1973). Potential 
solutions must then be analyzed holistically to determine 
their effectiveness and to understand how they will impact 
the various stakeholders. 
The larger problem is how to ensure users’ rights to privacy 
in a growing technological world. Using a holistic problem-
solving approach, this paper identifies technical solutions 
that employ existing and emerging RFID, WSN, and 
Bluetooth technologies, along with policy solutions that 
begin to address the social and ethical issues involved in 
building smart cities. 
2. Framing the Issue 
2.1 Smart Cities and Privacy
Smart cities are designed to improve the lives of citizens 
by creating an environment that continuously adapts and 
monitors data collection (Cui et al., 2018; Eckhoff & Wagner, 
2018; Sookhak et al., 2019). Amsterdam implemented its 
smart city plan with the intent of reducing CO2 emissions 
among infrastructure and people through smart building 
management systems, ship-to-grid power connections, and 
climate streets that feature LED lights, waste reduction 
systems, and smart meters (Šťáhlavský, 2011; Alaverdyan, 
2018). Vienna proudly advertises its commitment as a smart 
city to “digital data (mined using state-of-the-art technologies 
and analytical methods) to support decision-making and for 
real-time management of urban systems” (Stadt Wien, n.d.). 
China alone has more than 200 smart city plans in progress 
(Cui et al., 2018).
In these cities, multiple data sources from different data 
holders, devices, and applications can be combined to 
achieve city efficiency. However, doing so increases the risk 
of information being intercepted, which can have severe 
consequences (Eckhoff & Wagner, 2018). Applications 
which can collect highly sensitive data like citizen location 
or private documents may be used by system hackers 
(Sookhak et al., 2019). For instance, the Dyn company 
was hit with denial-of-service attacks in 2016 that saturated 
its infrastructure and disrupted host services (Khatoun & 
Zeadally, 2017). Additionally, a 2015 study demonstrated 
that a 2014 Jeep Cherokee could be hacked and controlled 
wirelessly by exploiting the vehicle’s Uconnect system (Miller 
& Valasek, 2015). This shows that the harm of infringing on 
someone’s privacy—for example, by locating an individual 
within a particular vehicle—can be immediate and physical. 
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2.2 Privacy and Security
Privacy is jeopardized by malicious attacks. There are two 
primary types of attacks: physical and system. Physical at-
tacks take advantage of a device in a physical manner and 
are not associated with network intervention. Examples of 
physical attacks include disabling devices, modifying devices, 
and cloning tags (Khattab et al., 2017). System attacks use 
malicious software to acquire information (Attacks, 2015). 
There are several common types of system attacks:
• Spoofing - impersonating another individual or   
 computer system
• Insertion - sending new messages from a host
• Replay - repeating or delaying data
• Relay - intercepting/manipulating messages                                     
   between two parties
• Denial-of-Service (DoS) - disrupting services of a              
   network-connected host
• Skimming - capturing information from a cardholder     
3. Smart City Technologies
3.1 RFIDs, WSNs, and Bluetooth
While privacy issues are raised by data collection practices 
used by smart cities and the companies they support, 
problems may also occur through potential security breaches. 
Smart cities track the identity and movement of objects 
through RFID tags, which combine a microchip and an 
antenna to store, process, and then relay or actively send data 
(Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011; Juels et al., 2003). Data 
in RFID tags is processed and sent through a vulnerable 
wireless network that connects each tag to its reader (Singh, 
2013). The reader sends an electromagnetic wave that drives 
the internal circuit of the tag to send data to the user if the 
signal is strong enough (Singh, 2013). 
Tracking and identifying objects within a smart city is 
necessary to provide inventory accuracy, advanced security, 
and efficiency for everyday usage. For instance, RFID tags 
are used for monitoring and analyzing locations, such as a 
greenhouse environment, or information stored on health 
devices (Subramanian et al., 2005). RFID tags can also be 
used to gain access to a compound or facility because the 
reader is able to locate the corresponding tag to gain access. 
The tags function in the same manner in cases that require 
bus entry, card access, or personnel tracking. RFID tags are 
also capable of detecting small concentrations of explosives 
and other dangerous chemicals (Subramanian et al., 2005).
Smart cities may also rely on WSNs, spatially diverse collec-
tions of sensors that monitor and gather data through con-
necting networks to support a range of operations (Conti, 
2016). These operations include surveillance, rescue support, 
fire prevention, and air pollution monitoring (Conti, 2016). 
WSNs have a vast range of sensor nodes and data storage 
receivers that can monitor physical and environmental con-
ditions. 
Additionally, smart cities may use Bluetooth technology 
to transfer data between devices. Bluetooth is based on a 
primary/replica relationship between devices. This means 
that one device has unidirectional control over the other. 
Using this relationship, Bluetooth can create ad hoc short-
range networks whose wireless traffic can be observed by 
malicious users within a densely populated area. Securing this 
wireless communication can increase the privacy individuals 
have when communicating on these channels.
3.2 Privacy Implications 
RFID tags are inexpensive, and connecting them to the IoT 
is relatively easy; however, security protocols and frameworks 
must be analyzed to secure the data transmission within a 
network. Due to the use of these tags in a connected city, 
data must be secured properly to prevent hacking. RFID 
tags store information as well as track and monitor objects 
or people. This can result in a violation of one’s privacy if 
this information is obtained. However, due to the constraints 
of RFID tags, such as limitations in memory size, energy, 
and response time, only specific security protocols can be 
implemented (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). RFID tag 
memory can be increased, but it would be costly. Currently, 
RFID tags can hold an average of 64 kB of data depending on 
the type of tag (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). According 
to Dominkus and Kraxberger (2011), these limitations of 
memory “could be a problem for the proposed security layer 
protocols” (p. 2647).
Security protocols can be different for the different types of
RFID tags available: active, semi-active, and passive. Active
and semi-active tags are powered by a battery; however, ac-
tive tags automatically send information while semi-active
remain dormant until receiving a reader signal (Dominikus
& Kraxberger, 2011). In contrast, passive tags do not have
a power source and require energy from the reader to send
information (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). Each of these
tags has different byte sizes and ranges to account for when
looking at its security framework (Singh, 2013). Because
passive tags hold less memory and are cheaper to produce,
they are more susceptible to attacks compared to active and
semi-active tags (Singh, 2013).
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WSNs provide high accessibility to data flows, but the “open” 
nature of the channel makes them prone to hacking (Khan 
& Mauri, 2014). WSNs are multivariate, meaning they are 
immune to computer attacks, which increases their security. 
However, adding mobility to any technology increases its 
vulnerability to security threats. Data is sent over the network 
with a larger range, increasing the time it takes for data to be 
received. 
With any technical device, there are constraints on its 
security implementation. That is to say, all security devices 
have resource requirements. For WSNs, there are limitations 
such as memory and power. The memory of a WSN can 
only hold 178 bytes for code storage in a TelosB with a 10K 
RAM, 48K program memory, and 1024K flash storage, thus 
providing limited storage for implementing security protocols 
(Conti, 2016). Additionally, encryption, decryption, and 
the transmission and storage of security data all consume 
power. This energy consumption limits the life span of the 
node (Khan & Mauri, 2014). Multi-hop routing, network 
congestion, and node processing can lead to greater latency 
in the network (Conti, 2016). High latency makes it difficult 
to achieve synchronization among sensor nodes. 
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) can be a cost-, time- and 
energy-efficient way of securely pairing mobile devices within 
a smart city where they are able to join or leave a network 
dynamically (Garcia, 2018). The security of each device is 
essential to the security of the entire network. If the devices 
of a network are not endowed with the same level of security, 
this creates a backdoor which can allow malicious activity to 
enter the network. Malicious attacks can cause technologies 
to be susceptible to detailed scans exposing informational 
parameters, service profiles, or even personal data (Haase & 
Handy, 2004).
4. RFID Technical Solutions 
If smart cities rely on RFID technologies, as is expected, 
security measures must be analyzed to ensure that data being 
sent over a wireless network is secure. Sensitive data is often 
found in devices that track information on an object, provide 
access to facilities, and transmit across the network. Security 
solutions have been devised at both the network and physical 
levels.
4.1 RFID Authentication and Eavesdropping
At the network level, RFIDs need to be authenticated 
properly to prevent hackers from eavesdropping on data 
transmission.One suggestion has been to make “Smart 
RFID” tags that generate their own random pseudo IDs so 
that a passive eavesdropper cannot encrypt the signal being 
sent by the reader (Juels et al., 2003; Sobti & Geetha, 2012). 
In this approach, A-TRAP protocols exchange three values 
generated pseudo-randomly between the tag and server (Le 
et al., 2007). The server checks to ensure that a designated 
value is in the database before accepting the tag as authentic. 
A-TRAP protocols offer “secure authentication, forward-
anonymity, availability, and key-indistinguishability,” but 
cannot withstand sustained attacks or instances when the 
tag is lost (Le et al., 2007, p. 13). Later proposed protocols 
generated four and five pseudo-random values to anonymize 
the communication between the server and the tag and to 
prevent replay attacks (Le et al., 2007). Despite the growing 
sophistication of these key mechanisms, as Avoine et al. 
(2011) pointed out a decade ago, they remain vulnerable to 
compromise in open communities with more open networks. 
4.2 RFID Denial-of-Service Attacks 
Connecting tags to the IoT system in a smart city makes them 
prone to attacks in an open network. One possibility is to use 
IPv6 to defend RFID tags against DoS attacks (Dominikus 
& Kraxberger, 2011). IPv6 is the most recent version of the 
Internet Protocol, and it uses 128-bit addresses to identify 
and locate devices on the network and route traffic across 
the Internet (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). According 
to Dominikus and Kraxberger (2011), a reader could track 
the communication with a mobile IPv6-enabled tag while 
also blocking attacks from suspicious nodes. Timeout values, 
which end one connection and accept new connection 
attempts, can also be randomized to defend against hackers. 
4.3 Physical Solutions to RFID Attacks
The ability to “kill” RFID tags when a good is purchased can 
be useful because dead RFID tags cannot collect consumer 
data (Juels et al., 2003). Similarly, the ability to put RFID 
tags to sleep allows users to turn tags on and off when desired 
(Sitlia et al., 2009). A more secure method of defending 
against physical attacks is through blocker tags. Blocker 
tags are RFID tags that can block readers from reading the 
identification of tags that exist in the blocker tag’s range 
(Juels et al., 2003; Sitlia et al., 2009).
5. WSN Technical Solutions 
Wireless sensor networks continuously monitor an 
environment to gather and organize sensitive information 
regarding city infrastructure. If this data were intercepted or 
if the technologies were hacked, one could obtain control 
over a spatial environment. Solutions have been devised to 
secure these technologies and their data. 
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5.1 WSN Authentication and Confidentiality 
Public-key cryptosystems are an effective method for 
securing WSN authentication and confidentiality. Some of 
the major techniques used in public-key cryptosystems are 
the Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman scheme (RSA), Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC), and Multivariate Quadratic 
Quasigroups (MQQ) (Gligoroski et al., 2008). Each of 
these techniques provides different efficiency, security, and 
memory usage, shown in Table 1. The design of ECC is tough 
to develop, but its complexity makes the system difficult to 
crack (Quirino et al., 2012).
Table 1: Public-Key Cryptosystem Comparisons
Note. Adapted from “Asymmetric Encryption in Wireless Sensor 
Networks” by G. Quirino, A. Ribeiro, and E. Moreno, 2012, 
(https://doi.org/10.5772/48464).
5.2 ECCE Protocol 
One experimental solution for WSN security concerns 
proposed by Conti et al. (2007) is an Enhanced Cooperative 
Channel Establishment (ECCE). The purpose of this 
protocol is to allow a secure wireless channel between two 
sensors that do not share any pre-deployed key (Conti et al., 
2007). According to Conti et al. (2007), “in comparison 
with other protocols, ECCE performs effectively in “channel 
existence and channel resilience” when faced with an attacker 
(p. 61). 
5.3 SPINS
A third solution is the use of SPINS, a secure communication 
protocol proposed by Perrig et al. (2002) that prevents 
eavesdropping and active attacks in wireless sensor networks. 
There are “two secure building blocks” associated with the 
SPINS protocol: SNEP and µTesla (Perrig et al., 2002, p. 
521). 
Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) uses a two-
party authentication protocol that provides confidentiality 
between the two corresponding parties (Perrig et al., 2002). 
A common protocol used for data authentication is the 
Message Authentication Code (MAC), which sends a message 
and a signature (Ullah et al., 2009). When the message has 
been obtained, the receiver performs a computation on the 
message and compares the generated message’s MAC value 
to the sent MAC value to determine if the message is from 
a legitimate user (Ullah et al., 2009). This process makes it 
feasible to use the SNEP protocol for the network system. 
SNEP “has low communication overhead” and “only adds 8 
bytes per message” (Perrig et al., 2002, p. 524). Therefore, it 
wouldn’t take up too many resources to use this protocol in a 
wireless sensor network. 
µTesla, an experimental, “‘micro’ version of the Timed 
Efficient Streaming Loss-tolerant Authentication protocol 
(TESLA), [provides] authenticated screening broadcast” 
(Ullah et al., 2009, p. 333). µTesla uses asymmetry through 
a delayed disclosure of symmetric keys, which results in 
an effective broadcast authentication scheme (Ullah et al., 
2009). Asymmetric cryptographic mechanisms by themselves 
are resource-intensive and require a significant amount of 
computation (Perrig et al., 2002). By using µTesla, this issue 
can be efficiently resolved. 
6. Bluetooth Technical 
Solutions
There are two key Bluetooth protocols: traditional Bluetooth 
and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). Bluetooth resides within 
the IEEE 802.15 protocol family dedicated for personal area 
networks (i.e., the networks for connecting an individual 
person’s devices). If Bluetooth is to be implemented within 
smart cities on a wide scale, traditional Bluetooth will not 
suffice. Traditional Bluetooth design requires one watt of 
power consumption and operates at a data transmission rate 
of 25 Mbps while BLE is ~2 Mbps (Bulíc et al., 2019). Un-
fortunately, a reduced capacity for security follows suit with 
this reduced data transmission rate and lowered power con-
sumption, similar to most wireless device communications.
 
During the pairing process, devices exchange their specific 
security and functionality capabilities. If the device-relative 
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capabilities are supported, the primary device will generate 
a temporary key, which will be used to produce the short-
term key. The short-term key is then used to encrypt the data 
transferred between devices. 
By contrast, the bonding process does persist across connec-
tions between devices to bypass the pairing phase on sub-
sequent connections. In order to bond two devices to each 
other, they must engage in an initial pairing process. Bond-
ing uses a long-term key stored on each device to encrypt the 
communication channel between them.
The different levels of security for Bluetooth depend on 
the capabilities of each device. If Bluetooth v4.2 or later is 
used, then the connection can be further secured, though 
not 100% secured. BLE v4.2 offers an enhanced security 
process utilizing the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, which allows 
two devices to generate a shared key on each side. Still, 
the security of the locally stored keys is imperative to BLE 
security (Kainda et al., 2009).
Unfortunately, Bluetooth devices authenticate devices rather 
than the users of devices. To investigate and enhance user 
authentication, a study was conducted in 2009 to test the 
usability of different methods for pairing secure devices 
(Kainda et al., 2009). Kainda et al. (2009) found that the 
“Compare & Confirm” method shown in Table 2 is the 
easiest for users to interface with as they pair unfamiliar 
devices. In addition, no security failures arose during the 
study using the “Compare & Confirm” method, suggesting 
that it is promising for increasing security (Kainda et al., 
2009).
To help the general public realize that these low energy 
devices result in low security, they should be informed of 
their vulnerabilities. However, the public should also be made 
aware of possible methods for securing Bluetooth devices.
 
When pairing Bluetooth devices, Out-of-Band (OOB) 
channels should be implemented with personal identification 
numbers as opposed to link keys. This approach should 
prevent persistent man-in-the-middle attacks in an open 
environment where attackers can snoop for keys sent between 
devices. Additionally, these PINs should be set to a longer 
value that includes both letters and numbers. However, this 
technique would be restricted to devices which have displays.
An active attack increases the amount of power it consumes 
as a result of the increased traffic it receives and potentially 
distributes. Even if the attack is unsuccessful, the increased 
Table 2: Potential Bluetooth Pairing Methods
Note. Adapted from “Usability and Security of Out-of-Band Chan-
nels in Secure Device Pairing Protocols” by R. Kainda, I. Flechais, and 
A. Roscoe, 2009, (https://doi.org/10.1145/1572532.1572547).
power consumption renders the targeted device offline, 
thereby reducing the capabilities of the Bluetooth network. 
Restricting a device’s power consumption rate will reduce the 
propensity for this issue to occur. 
7. Ethical Frameworks for Privacy 
and Cybersecurity
The big questions concerning the ethics of big data not only 
pertain to what information is being collected, but also “who 
and what is subjected to analysis” (Crawford et al., 2014, 
p. 1666). That is, might some people be subjected to more 
scrutiny than others? Questions of justice must be considered
when the benefits and risks of data collection in a smart city 
are unevenly distributed.
One issue with big data is the ability to link specific 
information with an identity. However, if an identity is not 
associated with information, is it ethical to use this data 
for analysis? The answer may vary depending on whether 
it serves civil, commercial, or private interest. Civil interest 
would include, for example, estimating the number of 
people by pinging devices for public transportation in the 
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interest of efficiency. This would not link identity, but rather 
the number of devices in a specific location. 
Commercial interest describes collecting and analyzing 
data for a profit motive, which may include using Internet 
browsing history and recent purchases to predict what a 
user would most likely be interested in. This practice links 
an identity to data, which could be deemed unethical 
depending whether the practice is transparent and done 
with user consent. Ethical dilemmas regarding data analysis 
will be raised by smart cities. It is important for the public 
to assess the dangers of unethical data usage early on in the 
development of smart cities so that policymaking does not 
lag too far behind the technological advancement these cities 
will bring. Once smart cities are already built, it will be much 
more difficult to rethink how they address privacy.
8. Policy Approach
Smart cities are still in the early stages of development. This 
means that privacy and security concerns will continue 
to arise, but it also means there is an opportunity now to 
build smart cities with stakeholders’ interests in mind. The 
severity of privacy issues will depend on how smart cities are 
governed. In this section, we weigh the best policy scenarios 
for a developing smart city.
Smart cities will involve vast amounts of information, 
processed by artificial intelligence or people for the sake of 
learning individual or societal trends. This information will 
be analyzed for a range of purposes, from running more 
efficient in-city transportation to supporting company profit 
motives (Walker, 2019). Private information, such as one’s 
daily routine, hobbies, and interests, could be acquired by 
different actors for different purposes. Unlike traditional 
urban areas, “smart cities have become data-centric projects 
focusing on the constant generation, collection, and 
processing of data” (What Are Smart Cities?!, 2008). With 
information constantly relaying from device to device, proper 
security protocols and management of this information 
needs to be regulated by governing entities to ensure privacy 
and security for citizens, companies, and governments are 
maintained. 
There is a growing push to regulate data for privacy purposes. 
For example, there is a movement within the United States 
“calling on the federal government to create an entirely new 
federal agency tasked with data privacy protection” (Krishan, 
2019). An approach in the context of smart cities would be 
to create mandatory government authorizations to handle 
different types of information. Additionally, there should 
be rules and procedures governing the use and sharing of 
data. A state level government agency should oversee data 
flow along with issuing these authorizations to ensure local 
control in the smart city developing process. Its purpose 
would be to inspect and investigate companies suspected of 
illegal information practices. This will make data harder to 
obtain while also punishing individuals or companies who 
mishandle it. 
Table 3: Data Priority Tiers
Note. Adapted from “District of Columbia Data Policy” by Office 
of the Mayor, April 27, 2017, (https://octo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/
dc/sites/octo/page_content/attachments/2017-115_District-of-Colum-
bia-Data-Policy.pdf ).
Data makes a smart city function. Therefore, it is important 
to help the public recognize that not all data has the same level 
of sensitivity. To do this, data could be classified into tiers 
like those displayed in Table 3. Smart cities might consider 
creating data regulatory agencies to oversee this classification 
system. As Washington D.C. has done with its dataset 
classification levels, higher tiers could correspond to greater 
security risks and greater offenses if information is mishandled 
or stolen (Office of the Mayor, 2017). For example, Tier 1 
could include data not linked to individual identity. The data 
regulatory agency might determine that accessing this tier of 
data does not need authorization except for specific cases. 
de Groot (2019) summarizes three principles for classifying 
data: context, content, and user. Context-based classification 
looks for sensitive information; content-based classification 
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“looks at application, location, or creator,” and user-based 
classification “relies on user knowledge and discretion at 
creation, edit, review, or dissemination” (de Groot, 2019).
Authorizations to handle this information would be issued 
by the data regulatory agency. These authorizations would 
ensure proper care for the different types of data and hold 
those accountable who use it incorrectly or jeopardize 
its privacy/integrity. The agency could also coordinate 
inspections to make sure companies and other entities are 
complying with proper data protocols.
Predicting the future outcomes of a smart city will steer 
development as well. A societal shift concerning the 
importance of data must be viewed as an important step 
in smart city development. An informed public should be 
the first step toward protecting privacy. Smart cities involve 
uncertainties which means many legislative decisions may be 
made in a reactive manner; however, steps can be taken to 
proactively protect privacy at this early stage of development. 
This can be done through planning and the construction of 
a data governing framework. This should push the citizens 
affected by the new framework to better understand the 
system and what it means for them. 
9. Conclusions 
Smart cities prioritize efficient systems over privacy. This will 
continue to be the case “as the amount of data gathered via 
the IoT continues to grow” (Newman, 2019). Privacy will 
always be a major concern in smart cities due to the vast 
collection of data through many systems. Many of these 
systems link identity with the data. This poses a threat to 
privacy and raises questions: Who owns and analyzes this 
data, and, as Newman (2019) asked, “At what point does the 
data collection become too much?” and “When is privacy 
more important than convenience?”
 
With a society that is constantly connected to a network, 
privacy will be a concern due to the prevalence of data 
breaches and hackings. Devices constantly collect and 
analyze data whether citizens have agreed to it or not. To 
implement security practices that ensure data integrity and 
confidentiality, a holistic analysis is required to understand 
the interconnected systems that collectively comprise a 
smart city. If a holistic approach is not taken, many “well-
intentioned efforts [could] lead to policy resistance, where 
our policies are delayed, diluted, or defeated by unforeseen 
reactions” (Sterman, 2000). Additionally, while technical 
solutions can address and even anticipate hackers’ security 
attacks, only policy planning can control how data will 
collected and design how it will be used.
Complex problems rarely have simple solutions; therefore, 
it is important to assess all dimensions of a smart city before 
implementing change. It is also important to understand 
what these changes might do to the system because none 
of the proposed solutions work independently from one 
another. They are all a part of the same system to combat the 
interference of hacking and the invasion of privacy. Due to 
the complex nature of the problem, technical and regulatory 
solutions must be devised to work hand in hand to protect 
privacy as smart cities progress.
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